The United States finds itself in an unfamiliar position. After spending approximately one hundred and fifty THAAD interceptors and eighty SM-3 missiles to help defend Israel during the Twelve-Day War in June 2025, the Pentagon faces a stark reality. Its stockpiles are depleted, its production lines cannot keep pace, and another major conflict with Iran would require an air defense umbrella America can no longer fully provide.

The question is not whether the United States wants to strike Iran again. The question is whether it can afford to.

For now, the answer appears to be no. But history suggests this pause may be temporary, with negotiations serving not as a genuine path to peace but as a strategic timeout while Israel restocks its depleted munitions and air defenses. After all, the Twelve-Day War itself kicked off in the middle of active negotiations that critics across the political spectrum described as either a deliberate ruse or a diplomatic process Israel cynically sabotaged.

Throughout the clash with Israel, the Israeli government worked hard to control the narrative about what Iran’s missiles actually hit. Military censorship laws prevented journalists from reporting strike locations near sensitive facilities. But satellite data told a different story.

A report by The Daily Telegraph using radar analysis from Oregon State University revealed that Iranian missiles struck at least five Israeli military facilities with remarkable accuracy. These included Tel Nof Airbase, Camp Glilot housing Unit 8200, Israel’s premier signals intelligence unit, and Zipporit weapons manufacturing facility.

None of these strikes were reported from within Israel. Professor Jerome Bourdon of Tel Aviv University explained, “We probably will never know the full extent of the damage.”

Haifa’s BAZAN oil refinery was shut down for two weeks with an estimated $250 million loss. Soroka Medical Center in Beersheba took a direct hit from Iran’s missile barrage. Most critically, by June 18, a U.S. official disclosed that Israel was running low on Arrow interceptors. The Washington Post reported assessments that Israel could only maintain missile defense for ten to twelve more days. The war’s duration was constrained by the physical limits of both sides’ arsenals.

The United States used approximately 25% of its entire global THAAD stockpile during the Twelve-Day War, firing roughly one hundred and fifty interceptors. It also expended eighty SM-3 interceptors and thirty Patriot PAC-3 interceptors. The problem is that production cannot remotely keep pace with consumption.

THAAD interceptors are manufactured at a rate of only eleven to twelve per year. That means replacing the one hundred and fifty interceptors fired during the Twelve-Day War would take more than twelve years at current production rates. CSIS analysts warned in late 2025 that no new THAAD interceptors would be delivered until 2027, creating a dangerous gap.

Even after the Pentagon reprogrammed $700 million into THAAD procurement, that only covers about forty-five missiles at $15 million each. As JINSA’s Ari Cicurel warned, “Both Israel and the US used an immense amount of their interceptor stockpiles. We are still very far behind in replenishing to get back to what we had before.”

By January 2026, defense experts were sounding the alarms that depleted interceptor stocks were constraining the Trump administration’s options regarding Iran, since another war would require the same defense umbrella the United States can no longer fully provide.

The interceptor shortage is just one symptom of a deeper structural problem. A Foundation for Defense of Democracies report published in April 2025 audited twenty-five weapons systems committed or potentially committed to Taiwan, Ukraine, and Israel. The finding was stark. Only seven of twenty-five had a strong defense industrial base, while the remaining eighteen were either weak or required significant attention.

Consider 155mm artillery shells. The Army targeted 100,000 rounds per month by October 2025. As of June 2025, production stood at just 40,000 per month. Even that figure is misleading. Only 18,000 complete rounds with propellant were being produced monthly because the United States depends on a single plant in Canada for artillery propellant and has no domestic production.

Against this backdrop, the United States and Iran resumed negotiations on February 6, 2026, in Muscat, Oman. After eight months of silence following the Twelve-Day War, talks restarted with delegations led by Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.

The timing invites skepticism. The Twelve-Day War was launched on June 13, 2025, exactly three days before the sixth round of nuclear negotiations was scheduled. Israel struck while Iran was in what War on the Rocks described as “diplomatic preoccupation with Washington” and “military unpreparedness.”

Araghchi called the strikes a “betrayal of diplomacy,” stating, “We were supposed to meet with the Americans on 15 June to craft a very promising agreement…It was a betrayal of diplomacy and unprecedented blow to the foundations of international law.”

The Wall Street Journal reported “U.S. Diplomacy Served as Cover for Israeli Surprise Attack.” Trump told the New York Post after the strikes, “I always knew the date. Because I know everything.”

Doug Bandow noted that the Cato Institute reported that Israeli officials stated “Israel and the U.S. carried out a multi-faceted misinformation campaign” to convince Iran a strike was not imminent and that Trump “was an active participant in the ruse and knew about the military operation since Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu decided to move forward with the strike.”

Whether current negotiations represent genuine diplomacy or another strategic pause remains open. Araghchi stated that “existing mistrust poses a significant hurdle” to progress.

From a military industrial perspective, the current negotiations serve a clear purpose regardless of diplomatic intent. They buy time. Israel’s defense ministry purchased weapons worth 220 billion shekels, approximately $61.5 billion, in 2024, four times previous years, reflecting the desperate need to restock. Israel is now accelerating development and production of Arrow 3, Arrow 4, Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and ground based laser systems in anticipation of a potential second round.

The United States faces the same imperative. The Trump administration has pledged a record $1 trillion defense budget and the 2026 NDAA authorized multiyear procurement for key munitions. But experts warn these measures are necessary but insufficient given the scale of the gap between production capacity and real-world consumption rates.

The fundamental question is how long it takes to rebuild stockpiles sufficiently to contemplate another major conflict. With THAAD production at eleven to twelve interceptors per year and no new deliveries until 2027, the answer is measured in years, not months.

One thing has become clear. Military industrial issues are coming back to the fore. And the United States, despite its constant bragging about being exceptional, faces the same resource constraints that all mortal imperial polities have previously faced.

Wargames by the Center for New American Security found the United States would run out of long range munitions in less than a week in a fight with China over Taiwan. The Twelve-Day War revealed the United States cannot sustain high intensity conflict support for even one ally without severely depleting its stockpiles.

The current negotiations with Iran may represent genuine diplomacy. Or they may represent a tactical pause to allow Israel time to rebuild its defenses before the next round. Either way, the resource constraints are real. The production gaps are real. And the physical limits of America’s military industrial base now constrain its foreign policy options in ways Washington has not experienced in decades.

The quicker the United States recognizes these limits and pursues a more restrained foreign policy, the better off it will be. The alternative is to continue pretending that stockpiles replenish themselves, that production lines can magically accelerate, and that America can wage unlimited war in unlimited theaters without consequence.

The Twelve-Day War proved otherwise. The question is whether Washington has learned the lesson.