I was astonished in 2009 when I saw the cancellation of the Future Combat System contract to usher in the next generation of armored vehicles. The Army cancelled the billions-dollar program and got to witness the Army continuing to burns through tens of millions a week after cancellation to fulfill contract obligations with nothing to show for it but a big smoking hole where the money had been wasted for nothing.

The XM1202 light tank was another ill considered blunder in the trail of tears that is the Sovietized and sclerotic acquisition system in the US Army and the DoD.

The U.S. Army spent over $21.4 billion on the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program, which was canceled in 2009. While the initial estimated cost was $92 billion, and some estimates even reached $200-300 billion, the actual amount spent was just under $20 billion, with some debates about how much of that was for the termination process itself.

The 2006 budget estimates and rosy picture were typical of the fiscal idiocy of Pentagon spending.

Read and weep here.

At the same time, the US Army had adopted its new camouflage uniform, the infamous and ghastly ACUs and dumped five billion dollars into it despite before and during adoption and quick retirement it never performed well against its competitors.

And the nonsense has been non-stop since 1945.

Perhaps the XM1202’s biggest drawback was that it was designed to fight conventional adversaries. Following the September 11 attacks, though, the strategic focus of the U.S. military shifted to a counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) model. In the American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the XM1202’s long range was a useless advantage—and its light armor a critical disadvantage, leaving the vehicles far more vulnerable to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other short-range attacks than the heavily-armored Abrams beasts.

The nail in the coffin for the XM1202 came after the 2008 financial crisis. In 2009, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates slashed his department’s budget in response to the downturn, targeting programs he believed were too costly or misaligned with the current needs of the force. The FCS MGVs, including the XM1202, were canceled due to their high cost and perceived lack of adaptability to evolving threats. No complete XM1202 was ever built, though a prototype turret and several hulls were created.

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The XM1202’s cancellation underscored the need for adaptability in military procurement, as evolving threats like IEDs and hybrid warfare require flexible, multi-role platforms. The M1 Abrams, despite its venerable age, continues to serve as the Army’s primary MBT. 

At the same time, though, the revolution in unmanned systems that is occurring today is upending even the vaunted status of the M1 Abrams in America’s arsenal. At 44 years old, the M1 Abrams MBT has been the primary armor combat system for the Army for too long—and the success of nimble missiles and drones against the lumbering Abrams tanks in the Ukraine War has already highlighted their limits. 

Above all, the XM1202 is a reminder of how dangerous the Pentagon’s planning can be. They often try to envision future wars, and the systems needed for those wars, based entirely on past ones. As the tank’s example illustrates, what came before might not always be indicative of what is to come—and though foresight is always difficult, attempting it in earnest is essential.

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/the-armys-xm1202-tank-fiasco-is-a-warning-for-future-weapons-development