Ely Ratner’s latest offering in Foreign Affairs, “The Case for a Pacific Defense Pact,” is a textbook example of how groupthink, careerism, and militarist ideology continue to warp U.S. foreign policy discourse. Ratner, now back at the Marathon Initiative after a stint as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, proposes a new multilateral NATO-style alliance in the Pacific. This would be a grotesque escalation of already dangerous U.S. commitments in East Asia. From the perspective of anyone interested in realism, restraint, or constitutional government, this proposal is not only strategically unwise but morally and fiscally indefensible.
Let us begin with the obvious. Ratner envisions binding the United States to the defense of Australia, Japan, and the Philippines, with others (e.g., South Korea, New Zealand) to follow. But the U.S. is already encumbered with mutual defense treaties in the region, such as with Japan and the Philippines—agreements that are themselves dangerous anachronisms dating from the early Cold War. Ratner, rather than asking whether these entanglements serve American interests, wants to double down by interlocking them in a region-wide web of obligations. To what end? To contain China, a country that, despite its size, has shown no intention or ability to project power beyond its near seas in a sustained or existentially threatening way.
The notion that Beijing aspires to be the next Nazi Germany, complete with pan-regional domination, is sheer fantasy—one that defense contractors and think tanks like the Marathon Initiative and the Center for a New American Security are happy to propagate for funding and prestige. Ratner is a veteran of both. His entire professional career has been spent either in government positions advocating military buildup or in think tanks crafting white papers that rationalize the same. That this man would now argue for institutionalizing a war alliance against the very country he has built his career warning against is predictable, but no less dangerous.
Libertarians have long warned against expansive foreign commitments that tie American lives and treasure to the ambitions and anxieties of foreign powers. Ratner’s proposed “Pacific Defense Pact” would formalize exactly the sort of blank-check militarism that the Founders abhorred. It would commit the United States to a potential war over rocks in the South China Sea or fishing disputes in the East China Sea, escalating every regional quarrel into a possible global conflict. If China is a threat to Japan or the Philippines, those nations—wealthy and capable in their own right—can and should take responsibility for their own defense.
Ratner attempts to buttress his case by citing the growing military cooperation among Australia, Japan, and the Philippines. But rather than taking this as evidence that these states are capable of handling their own regional affairs, he takes it as a reason for the U.S. to get more deeply involved. This is precisely backward. If America’s allies are increasing their capabilities and coordination, what better time to reduce, not increase, U.S. exposure?
Moreover, the article is riddled with familiar alarmism: Chinese ships near disputed islands, alleged disinformation campaigns, and weaponized economic policies. Ratner ignores the fact that the United States engages in all of these tactics itself. He paints a picture of a defensive, peace-loving Washington encircled by an aggressive, expansionist Beijing—a cartoonish dichotomy unworthy of serious analysis. He also omits any discussion of the provocative role the U.S. has played in stoking regional tensions, such as through arms sales, freedom-of-navigation operations, and explicit promises to defend Taiwan.
The article’s most galling claim is that the proposed pact would not burden the U.S. military with new obligations but would merely formalize existing relationships. This is either dishonest or delusional. Anyone familiar with alliance politics knows that formalizing mutual defense guarantees dramatically raises expectations, lowers diplomatic flexibility, and can actually increase the likelihood of conflict since such pacts, once signed, create pressure to demonstrate credibility, to act decisively, and to escalate disputes that might otherwise be ignored or resolved diplomatically.
From a constitutional and fiscal perspective, Ratner’s proposal is especially dangerous. The U.S. is $34 trillion in debt, overstretched militarily, and embroiled in military deployments on every continent. The last thing it needs is a new Cold War style alliance. Japan, the Philippines, and Australia (along with a host of others, such as India, Indonesia, and South Korea) are perfectly capable of defending themselves against a country that still struggles to project naval power beyond the first island chain.
In sum, Ratner’s Pacific Defense Pact is not a serious proposal for American security. It is a serious proposal for keeping the defense contractors flush, the think tanks buzzing, and the machinery of war humming. As the author of The Fake China Threat and Its Very Real Danger, I must once again stress: this fear-mongering has real costs—to our economy, to our liberty, and to the lives of Americans who might be asked to fight and die in a wholly unnecessary war. We should reject Ratner’s vision not only because it is strategically misguided but because it is morally bankrupt.
