Though it’s rare to hear someone praise the military-industrial-congressional complex, it is only the latter component that masks a praiseworthy feat.  Markets—also known as “people” voluntarily exchanging—have devised the most efficient methods for producing weapons in the United States, but Congress—or the government, in general—is what hampers the sale of these weapons. The U.S. is the world’s largest arms exporter, but the international weapons market would benefit further if the U.S. regime had nothing to do with it.  Ensuring the separation of administration and armaments would benefit not only Americans but virtually every person on the planet. When it comes to manufacturing weapons, American industrial prowess is unrivaled, but, as Robert Higgs explains, the level of corruption also appears to be unmatched:

It is regrettable in any event for people to suffer under the weight of a state and its military apparatus, but the present arrangement—a system of military-economic fascism as instantiated in the United States by the [military-industrial-congressional complex]—is worse than full-fledged military-economic socialism. In the latter, people are oppressed by being taxed, conscripted, and regimented, but they are not co-opted and corrupted by joining forces with their rapacious rulers; a clear line separates them from the predators on the “dark side.” In the former, however, the line becomes blurred, and a substantial number of people actively hop back and forth across it…

How can the military-industrial-congressional complex become less loathsome? Make it less fascistic; remove democracy’s corrupting influence by extricating Congress from the complex. When a foreign government wishes to purchase weapons from an American manufacturer, it must first gain approval from the State Department, Congress, the Department of Defense, or even from the president. Why is that? Defenders of the status quo screech the tired refrain of “national security,” but as John Tamny makes clear, there’s no way of guaranteeing a good’s final destination:

It’s too easily forgotten by the deep and not-so-deep in thought that production is all about the getting. Goods and services always flow. Everywhere. Without regard to embargoes and sanctions. To be clear, if you’re producing, you’re getting.

Yes, if Country A produces weapons but doesn’t want Country Z to have them, there’s no stopping Buyer D, U, M, or B from selling to Z. But will “we” sell weapons to “the terrorists?” That is the wrong question. Per Tamny, “there’s no getting around the economic fact of life that there’s no accounting for the final destination of any good,” and there’s no policy—imposed preference—that can get around that fact either. “The terrorists” will obtain whatever they’d like. The pertinent question to ask is, who will sell to “the terrorists”?  Currently, weapons manufacturers are somewhat insulated from the court of public opinion. Instead of the collective judgement that markets provide, only a handful of bureaucrats—or just one person, the U.S. president—decide which buyers are morally deserving of receiving American weapons, and, unlike with markets, they’ll suffer no repercussions if their decisions are wrong.

Can government officials be trusted to make ethical decisions? The question answers itself. Again, “the terrorists,” like it or not, receive the weapons they’re able to purchase, just as addicts receive the drugs they’re not ‘allowed’ to have. What must be scrutinized is who bears responsibility for the transactions. Under the status quo—because it’s immune from market forces—not only will government officials suffer no consequences for their lack of knowledge; the collective knowledge of the people—“markets”—is subordinate to the limited knowledge (and morality) of the parasitic caste.  When a monopoly loses its state-sponsored privileges, it must act like every other business: it must adapt to social pressure. The newly ‘exposed’ weapons manufacturer must suffer the consequences—good or bad—of selling or marketing to governments or “terrorists” when doing so might carry some moral implications.

The countries we’re told are our enemies possess enough nuclear weapons to destroy the entire planet many times over, but “national security” dictates who is allowed to purchase far-less deadly weapons from American manufacturers? The United States is fortunate to have within its borders a beast of a weapons-producing behemoth, but a bureaucrat or politician must intervene in the sale of these weapons? To say that this makes no sense brings new meaning to “understatement.” Ludwig von Mises discussed the unbridled arrogance of government officials who believe that they can plan not only the economy but also foreign wars:

The sudden transition from peace to war revolutionizes the structure of the market, makes radical readjustments indispensable and thus becomes for many a source of high profits. The planners and interventionists regard such profits as a scandal. As they see it, the first duty of government in time of war is to prevent the emergence of new millionaires. It is, they say, unfair to let some people become richer while other people are killed or maimed… It may be admitted that it is not “fair” that war enhances the profits of those entrepreneurs who contribute best to the equipment of the fighting forces. But it would be foolish to deny that the profit system produces the best weapons.

Due to “national security,” instead of selling weapons to whomever wants to buy them, American manufacturers must rely on its best customer—the U.S. government—and nothing boosts demand for these companies’ products more than the fear of the “horrendous monsters” we’re told to hate. Instead of “national security,” how about the right of self-defense? Is it a universal, natural right, or is it doled out as a privilege by pompous parasites? If American weapons manufacturers could sell their products to whichever foreign or domestic customer wishes to buy them, the perverse incentive—inducing the U.S. regime to make the young and healthy ‘serve’ their country—would be drastically diminished if not entirely eliminated. Yes, if more of the war economy were subjected to market forces, weapons manufacturers would be better off, and there would be less incentive for war. Mises elaborates:

Capitalism is essentially a scheme for peaceful nations. But this does not mean that a nation which is forced to repel foreign aggressors must substitute government control for private enterprise. If it were to do this, it would deprive itself of the most efficient means of defense.

Tamny continues to make clear what eludes most economists: “the crisis is always in government actors stepping on market signals.” And with the crisis removed from the complex, security and prosperity would abound.  As foreign countries—friend and foe alike—equip themselves with the best weapons money can buy, the risk associated with attacking those countries would dramatically increase. “National security” would be transformed from a lame excuse for imperialism into an actual deterrence against imperialists. And with the parasitic tendency of the military-industrial-congressional complex now removed, defending one’s country would no longer be conflated with invading another.