As the world experiences significant geopolitical changes, political blocs like the European Union have a unique opportunity to chart a new path.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union and its twenty-seven member states have delivered nearly $155 billion in financial, military, humanitarian, and refugee assistance to Ukraine. Of that aid sent to Ukraine, the combined military support from the EU and its member states is estimated at €49.6 billion ($53 billion).
This represented a transatlantic initiative to draw Russia into a protracted conflict in Ukraine through proxy warfare. However, this Western-backed proxy war appears to have fallen short, as Russia continues to make incremental gains on the battlefield and now seems positioned to preside over a de facto east-west partition of the country.
Additionally, Donald Trump’s re-election in 2024 has significantly altered the geopolitical dynamics of the conflict. Although his administration has not resolved the war as swiftly as promised on the campaign trail, it appears unwilling to continue the large-scale military aid packages of previous years.
Significantly, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s remarks at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting in Brussels on February 12 served as a further wake-up call for Europe. In his speech, Hegseth outlined a “division of labor” strategy, urging Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own security as the United States shifts its focus toward strategic competition with China.
This shift was underscored by Hegseth’s dismissal of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) traditional collective security model, as he explicitly ruled out Ukraine’s NATO membership as “unrealistic” and warned that any European peacekeeping forces in Ukraine would not receive Article 5 protections. While the U.S. maintains close to 100,000 troops in Europe, Hegseth emphasized that this presence should not be interpreted as a long-term security guarantee. Instead, he has urged European nations to “lead from the front” by increasing defense spending to 5% of GDP—a significant leap from the NATO 2% benchmark.
The European Union has answered the call for rearmament by launching an €800 billion “ReArm Europe” initiative, focusing on modernizing military capabilities such as drones, artillery, and missile systems. Germany, the EU’s largest economy, has become the central pillar of the plan. After a parliamentary vote to suspend its constitutional “debt brake.” Germany pledged €600 billion ($652 billion) over the next decade to modernize its armed forces, a figure that surpasses the EU’s entire annual budget.
In line with Germany’s military buildup, countries like Poland are boosting their defense budgets. Warsaw has vowed to spend 4.7% of its GDP, the highest in NATO, and aims to field 1,500 tanks by 2030. A central pillar of the ReArm Europe Plan is reducing dependency on American arms exports. The EU aims to increase intra-European defense procurement from 18% to 35% by 2030, leveraging initiatives like the European Defense Fund (EDF) to subsidize domestic production.
Europe’s rearmament efforts have been marked by internal divisions though. Eastern European states, shaped by historical experiences under Imperial Russian or Soviet control, adopt a more assertive stance toward Russia. In contrast, Western European countries, being more geographically removed, tend to favor a more measured approach.
Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez recently poured cold water on the notion of a unified Russian threat, stating, “Our threat is not Russia bringing its troops across the Pyrenees.”
Instead, he advocated for greater attention to Mediterranean security challenges such as migration and regional instability. Gabrielius Landsbergis, Lithuania’s former foreign minister, took exception to the Spanish leader’s remarks. During a visit to Kiev he said, “The further west you travel, the more difficult it is to imagine that sort of thing [Russian aggression].” This divergence underscores a deepening fissure within the European Union, where geographical proximity to Russia correlates with defense prioritization.
Indeed, Europe ought to pursue an independent foreign policy, befitting its legacy as one of the world’s great centers of civilization. It should not consign itself to the role of a mere outpost for the often-perfidious ambitions of U.S. foreign policy. Yet, forging such an autonomous path will not be a cakewalk.
Nevertheless, European nations possess the capacity to chart a new course by embracing a foreign policy grounded in realism and restraint. This approach stands in stark contrast to the United States’ tendency toward fantastical projects aimed at reshaping the world in its own image or relentlessly seeking global primacy.
Ultimately, true independence will only be realized when Europe regards sovereignty not as a rhetorical flourish, but as a guiding principle of statecraft. Achieving this will require European nations to move beyond the universalist agendas of yesteryear—neoconservativism and neoliberalism—and instead adopt a more modest and pragmatic approach to international affairs.
