At first glance, Washington’s informal but very real commitment to defend Taiwan and preserve its de facto independence seems quite secure. Over the past decade, Taipei’s security relationship with the United States grew steadily closer—with strong bipartisan approval in the United States. Not only was that development apparent during Donald Trump’s first administration, but also, to the surprise of many experts on East Asian affairs, the trend persisted throughout Joe Biden’s presidency.
The prevailing assumption was that Trump’s return to the White House would be very good news for hardliners in Taiwan who want to push the envelope on independence. Elbridge Colby, the official whom Trump chose to be undersecretary of defense for policy in his second administration, is renowned for being an avid supporter of Taiwan. Indeed, Colby embraces a hardline approach toward Beijing on a range of issues throughout East Asia.
However, Trump’s early statements indicated that Washington’s support for Taiwan’s security was far from unconditional. He immediately pressured Taipei to raise its yearly defense spending—reportedly to 5% of annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP). That is the same demand Trump is making to all members of NATO, and it is consistent with the U.S. president’s rhetorical commitment to an “America First” foreign policy overall. One of his complaints dating from his 2016 presidential election campaign is that too many U.S. allies engage in “free riding” on Washington’s military exertions. Trump’s insistence on greater “burden sharing” by America’s security clients has been a consistent theme of his tenure in the White House.
However, the response of U.S. allies in both East Asia and Europe has been inconsistent and generally unenthusiastic. It was not until 2024 that even a majority of NATO members reached the longstanding target of spending two percent of annual GDP on defense. At the 2025 NATO summit, the members (except for Spain) officially accepted Washington’s new target of boosting military spending to 5% of GDP, but it remains extremely doubtful whether most members will actually comply with the higher figure.
Washington’s security dependents in East Asia have been even more desultory than their NATO counterparts about boosting defense outlays, regardless of Washington’s wishes and hectoring. Taiwan is no exception. There appears to be little support among the Taiwanese people for boosting military spending to anywhere near the level Trump envisions.
Taiwan’s economic importance—especially its leading global role as a producer of cutting-edge semiconductors—makes the island an important economic prize. Taiwan’s crucial location as the anchor of the first island chain off of China’s coast enhances its strategic relevance. Nevertheless, Trump’s burden-sharing demands are creating some doubts about the extent and reliability of Washington’s willingness to defend its client.
Taipei cannot take Washington’s protection for granted. Indeed, Trump has been critical (even caustic) about Taiwan’s role as an economic competitor of the United States. Just before his election in 2024, he stated that Taiwan had stolen America’s semiconductor business through unfair trade practices. At a minimum, such comments suggest that Washington will insist on significant economic policy concessions from Taipei as part of the price for continued, much less enhanced, U.S. military protection.
There also appears to be widespread uncertainty in the broader U.S. foreign policy community about both Taiwan’s commitment to its own defense and its willingness to avoid needless provocations toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Those twin objectives require a delicate balancing act by Taipei.
Comments that former senior U.S. military officials expressed after participating in a prestigious war game held in Taipei in early June 2025 highlighted that challenge. Notable participants included Michael Mullen, former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Dennis Blair, former U.S. Pacific commander. After the two-day exercise, multiple participants expressed worries about “systemic weaknesses” in Taiwan’s probable response to a simulated PRC attack set in 2030. Such comments indicated that expectations about the need for increased defense spending on the part of Taipei were not confined to the Trump administration.
At a press conference after the war game, Admiral Blair explicitly stated that the American response to a PRC attack on Taiwan would depend on both the cause of the conflict and the extent of Taiwan’s own commitment to self-defense. In what seemed to be a dual (and somewhat contradictory) admonition to Taipei, he emphasized that “Taiwan’s will to fight will have a great deal of effect” on U.S. decisions. However, “If a conflict were triggered by Taiwanese moves towards formal independence,” he added, “U.S. support would be far less certain.”
Such insistence on a balancing act by Taipei raises at least as many questions as it answers about Washington’s willingness to defend Taiwan. How much of an increase in Taiwan’s own defense effort does the United States expect? Can Taipei push its attempts to seek greater diplomatic space and become more involved in international affairs without triggering U.S. worries that such moves may unduly provoke Beijing? What will be the U.S. response if the PRC takes military action short of launching a direct attack on Taiwan? For example, what is Washington’s plan if Beijing proclaims and seeks to enforce a blockade of Taiwanese ports because of some alleged offense by Taipei? What if PRC forces invade a smaller island claimed by Taipei close to the Chinese coast or in the middle of the South China Sea, but do not attack Taiwan itself?
Senior Taiwanese officials insist that they remain extremely confident about the continuation of Washington’s security shield. Joseph Wu, the head of Taiwan’s National Security Council, had been especially emphatic on that point. Pro-Taiwan American analysts have reached a similar conclusion that Trump will never abandon Taiwan, given the island’s economic and strategic importance.
However, it is not clear just how thoroughly either American or Taiwanese leaders have thought through these matters and adopted coherent policies. The internal divisions in Taiwan about policy toward the PRC are especially concerning. Current President Lai Ching-te, the leader of the officially pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), favors a hardline stance toward Beijing. An opposition coalition consisting of the Kuomintang Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) controls the national legislature, however, and that coalition favors a more conciliatory approach to the PRC. The internal rivalry is growing more intense, and it is not likely to be resolved until the end of Lai’s term in 2028, if then. In the meantime, the Trump administration must deal with a client state that seems undecided about its own policy toward the PRC, even as it insists on a continuing U.S. security shield. This dangerous situation could turn into a major headache for the United States.
