Given that official Washington seems increasingly determined to fight Beijing over Taiwan, concerned Americans are right to wonder: how did the question of Taiwan come to be of such purported importance to these global powers?

While several closer islands, such as the Penghu (or the Pescadores as they are now known), were incorporated into the Chinese polity during the period of Ming blue water exploration in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Formosa (or Taiwan as it came to be known) never was.

After shuttering its large scale naval activities in the mid-fifteenth century, the Ming were thereafter largely content to let the rival trading companies of the Portuguese and Dutch quarrel for influence on Formosa, where trade revolved around tea and camphor.

In an odd bit of history repeating itself, the island first became a central focus of a ruling mainland Chinese regime as a result of a civil war that needed concluding: displaced by the invading Manchurian forces (the eventual Qing), in 1661 what remained of the Han, Ming ruling clique retreated to Formosa. It was following their ultimate defeat in 1683 that Formosa started to become ethically and administratively integrated into China (a process completed around a century later).

Despite its import as a trading hub in the centuries thereafter, when the Japanese took possession of Formosa at the end of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), per the terms of the Treaty Shimonoseki (1885), the island’s new rulers found a society, economy, and polity virtually untouched by modernity.

And while initially brutal, putting down an anti-Japanese insurgency of emigre Han Chinese and native Taiwanese, the Japanese colonial administration of the island, which lasted until the end of World War II, would see the island transformed into an educated, urbanized, and rationalized society with living standards far higher than on the mainland.

Despite the increasing gap, most Taiwanese, whose cultural links with the mainland were still strong, were open to rejoining mainland China when the war finally ended—although it is worth noting that this willingness proved short-lived, the Kuomintang (KMT) regime needing to viciously suppress a mass uprising against its terrible misrule in 1947.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, at whose feet a great deal of blame for a whole host of problems may be laid, also laid the foundation stone for misadventure in dealing with China, including Taiwan.

Indeed, while there was a reasonable possibility that Taiwan could have been its own independent country at the end of the Second World War, it was FDR and his successor, Harry Truman, who ensured this would not happen.

Ignoring the wisdom of multiple of his predecessors, who had refused to get involved either in internal Chinese squabbles or its feuds with neighboring Japan, FDR began supporting the KMT regime of Chiang Kai-Shek.

Mao had, at least on one occasion, expressed ambivalence, stating for the record in 1936 that he did not consider Taiwan to be a “lost territory.”

However, at a meeting in Cairo (1943) FDR acquiesced to Chiang Kai-Shek’s insistence that Taiwan be returned to China. Once that had happened, and once Harry Truman safeguarded his retreat in Taiwan, the calculation from Beijing’s perspective changed.

As in the seventeenth century case of the Ming and Qing, no government claiming to be the legitimate government of China could brook the continued existence of a rival claimant to the title occupying a large island fortress less than one hundred miles from the mainland shore.

Virtually all the primary and secondary sources are in agreement: the outbreak of mass war in Korea led to the fate of Taiwan being drawn into the Cold War paradigm. From official histories to revisionist and post revisionist accounts, whatever the particular nuances of the account in question, including libertarian realists who point to the domestic political incentive structures that principally drove foreign policy decision-making, the decision to fight the Cold War made certain Taiwan would be an American protectorate following Chiang and the KMT’s flight to the island following their loss of the Chinese Civil War to Mao and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

To be sure, there were many voices in the State Department who had championed abandoning the incompetent, corrupt, and brutal Chiang and simply making the best of things with the communist government they saw as inevitably on their way to winning the resumed Chinese Civil War—these would mostly be purged or resign during the (second) red scare, however, and the constraining Cold War atmosphere that followed meant that possible openings to China were unable to be grasped.

That this logical move, to exploit the growing divisions between Moscow and Beijing, was unable to be grasped by eager Cold Warriors was largely due to the efforts of the “China Lobby,” the supporters of “free China,” or the Republic of China on Taiwan.

Some, like New York businessman Alfred Kohlberg, had financial interests at stake; others, like the former U.S. Ambassador to China Patrick J. Hurley, had personal and ideological commitments; still others, like Senators Barry Goldwater and William Knowland, combined these factors; while media magnate Henry Luce, owner of Time and Life, ensured high profile oppositional platforms. They combined to resist moves to normalize relations with Beijing and abandon Taiwan, despite the desire of several White House administrations to do precisely that.

As authoritative, mainstream historians, such as Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, readily admit, it was these forces that made the clean break with the authoritarian and provocative Taipei regime, desired by Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter, impossible.

When Ronald Reagan, a rabid Taiwan champion, won the White House it cemented the unhealthy status quo.

Taiwan continues to enjoy a strong lobbying presence on Capital Hill, abetted now by the complex of think tanks aligned with military industrial and foreign governmental interests. None of them are ever going to say something so obvious as the truth: the fate of Taiwan has literally nothing to do with the well-being of the American people or even the American state in general.

It is about power—Washington’s power, specifically.

As Dave DeCamp reported back in 2021, a fundamental change came over official Washington during the Donald Trump years: no longer was Taiwan viewed as a “problem” in Sino-American relations. Rather, it was viewed as an “opportunity” to advance Washington’s anti-Beijing, containment agenda.

Americans should be made aware of this fact; the only thing China “threatens” is Washington’s attempted domination of the region through its network of clients.

Taiwan is increasingly front and center in this battle.

For its part, Taiwan has remained since the 1950s a primary objective of Beijing and this is unlikely to ever change.