On September 11, the Chicago Tribune published an op-ed by the director of the Asia Engagement Program at Defense Priorities and director of the China Initiative at Brown University, Dr. Lyle Goldstein, on the need for Washington to work to improve its relations with Beijing.
Formerly a research professor at the U.S. Naval War College for two decades, Dr. Goldstein retains nothing but respect from this author—referencing him at several points in The Fake China Threat and Its Very Real Danger regarding the security situation around the Taiwan Strait.
However, I could not but remark upon a few key passages that stood out to me in reading his generally worthy commentary from last week.
First, regarding the notion that the selection of Minnesota Governor Tim Waltz, who spent time teaching in China in his youth and has visited the country many times, as the Democratic vice presidential nominee offers evidence that the party “now understand the stakes in this most pivotal bilateral relationship,” seems wanting for evidence of this recognition.
From Politico to the The New York Times, NBC to TIME—what mattered was his ability to appeal to key demographics in the handful of states in play in the election without alienating other key constituencies in the Democrat’s confused big-tent coalition; he is a white, middle class guy, a veteran and gun owner who also supports all the key pillars of the progressive gospel, from climate change to gun control to abortion access. Zero mention of his expertise regarding China.
And even if Walz had some ideas as to what might be done, if the Pentagon and beltway securocrats disagreed, which they certainly would if his inclination were toward moderation, we already know from Donald Trump’s undermined attempted reset of relations with Russia that it isn’t going to happen.
On top of which, as Dr. Goldstein acknowledges, despite criticizing Trump’s bellicose first-term China policy from the sidelines, once in office the Joe Biden administration simply carried on the policy.
Much like going along with the previous administration’s Iran policy, one suspects it is simple cowardice in the face of the political calculation that being called “weak” on national security, true or not, would be more electorally damaging that making the right call geopolitically.
Second, while it is right and good to see Jake Sullivan and Antony Blinken now trying to make regular contact with their counterparts in Beijing, other key actors, such as top military leaders, have gone long periods, years in fact, without speaking—the Chinese side having cut off communication following a series of provocative acts by Washington over the Taiwan issue, specifically then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s ill-advised trip in 2022.
Such a pause in communication could well commence on similarly short notice should Washington trod too egregiously on what Beijing calls its “red lines” regarding its sovereignty and security prerogatives in its immediate region.
To say nothing of the continued economic war and military buildup in the region Washington is directing against Beijing—as well as accusing China of “enabling” Moscow’s war in Ukraine simply by virtue of being a trade partner with Russia (while remaining mum about the identical role played by India, whose cooperation Washington is avidly courting in its new containment policy).
Lastly, with respect to the volatile issue of Taiwan, which Dr. Goldstein (rightly) views as tending toward escalation and even spinning out of control, his characterization of President Richard Nixon’s moves to open Beijing as having “extricate[ed] the U.S. from the Chinese Civil War” is misleading; in fact, the most Nixon ever permitted Henry Kissinger to do was “acknowledge” Beijing’s position. When Jimmy Carter finally came along and cut ties with Taipei and recognized Beijing, Congress immediately passed the still-active Taiwan Relations Act, virtually forcing the White House into embracing strategic ambiguity (the policy of leaving Taipei and Beijing uncertain whether Washington would intervene in order to restrain both, while at the same time arming Taiwan).
That is to say, at no point has Washington ever, as it should have done long ago, extricated itself from the still unconcluded Chinese Civil War.
Therefore, while Dr. Goldstein’s advice that Washington “should embrace realism and restraint by signaling a return to strategic ambiguity” is welcome, as is his belief in a “stricter conformity with the one China policy,” he himself points out Washington is doing the opposite by openly declaring it will defend Taiwan, pouring forces into the region, and helping nearby allies like the Philippines upgrade bases closest to the Taiwan Strait.
In short, while the efforts of Dr. Goldstein and others toward bettering the relationship are appreciated, there is little to be optimistic about in Sino-American relations. Whether Donald Trump or Kamala Harris wins the White House, the best that will be able to be said is that they are likely to remain better than Russo-American relations: on ice for at least a generation.
