The US Navy and Marines have not conducted an amphibious assault on contested beach since Inchon in Korea (10-19 September 1950 although arguably the last major contested amphibious campaign in May of 1945 of Okinawa) and have practically abandoned surface maritime connectors from ship to shore in favor of helicopter lift and vertical envelopment. The recent debacle in Gaza with the shabby portable pier that lasted 20 days after delivering 8,800 tons of aid at a cost of 320 million dollars, now lost is a demonstration project that the US Navy has essentially lost its ship to shore capabilities.
The Navy is trying desperately to maintain a 31-ship amphibious fleet [10 amphibious ready groups (ARGs)] harnessed to a doctrine that is now defunct. To be clear; the US Navy conducts amphibious operations; the Marines conduct amphibious assaults.
American naval and marine forces have no capability conduct an amphibious operation/assault against a contested beach in a near-peer or peer environment.
And everyone reading this will know it not be capped at ten billion dollars.
A $5.79 billion award funds the detailed design and construction of three Flight II San Antonio-class amphibious warships – LPD-33, LPD-34 and LPD35. A second $3.8 bill award funds the advanced procurement and detailed design and construction for the future big deck amphib Helmand Province (LHA-10), according to the contract announcement.
https://news.usni.org/2024/09/24/ingalls-wins-9-6b-in-shipbuilding-contracts-for-4-amphibious-warhsips
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