Since Donald Trump returned to the White House on January 20, 2025, there was an initial sense of hope that he would wind down the conflict in Ukraine. However, continued flows of military aid to Ukraine and slow progress in the negotiations still make a lasting peace settlement a distant prospect.
The Trump administration’s preference would be to conclude the U.S. proxy war in Ukraine and shift its geopolitical gaze to Asia to contain China. The icing on the cake would be for the United States to have Russia break its “no limits partnership” with China to isolate the East Asian giant. In effect, Trump is attempting to pull a “reverse Nixon” strategy in its foreign policy approach. This strategy aims to improve relations with Russia to balance against China, in contrast to then-President Richard Nixon’s original approach of engaging with Communist China to counter the Soviet Union.
U.S. foreign policy, idealistic grandstanding notwithstanding, is suffused with cynical geopolitical plays. The Trump administration looks to use this sleight of hand against China by playing Russia off against it, even to the point of tricking both Eurasian heavyweights into protracted conflicts. Such a scenario would be every DC strategist’s dream—a Eurasian plane mired in conflict while the United States sits on the sidelines waiting for the moment to waltz in as the dominant power in the Eurasian domain. All of this done without firing a shot.
Heading back to reality: U.S. foreign policy strategists will find that prying Russia from China, much less baiting it into an open conflict with China, will be a tall order. The numerous factors that led to Richard Nixon’s historic visit to China in 1972, wherein Sino-American relations were subsequently normalized and exploited to serve as a counterweight against the Soviet Union, are not simply not there in the present.
For one, relations between the Soviets and Chinese were already fraught prior to Nixon and his trusty sidekick Henry Kissinger using clever statecraft to woo over the Chinese. Enter the Sino-Soviet split, in which relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union (USSR) deteriorated, starting in the late 1950s and intensifying throughout the 1960s.
This rupture in Sino-Soviet relations was brought about by a combination of factors. Following the death of Soviet strongman Joseph Stalin, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev initiated a de-Stalinization agenda and moved towards peaceful coexistence with the capitalist West, which Chinese leader Mao Zedong perceived as an ideological betrayal and “revisionism.” On Mao’s end, his Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution polices clashed with Khrushchev’s more moderate approach to communism.
The twentieth century split between the two Eurasian giants was not exclusively ideological; it had a geopolitical component as well. China’s growing assertiveness under Mao led to tensions over leadership in the communist world. The USSR’s decision to cut aid to Maoist China in 1960, coupled with the Soviet’s support for India during the Sino-Indian War of 1962, further strained Sino-Soviet relations. Border clashes between the Soviets and Chinese in 1969 underscored their rivalry, as U.S. foreign policy strategists looking from afar with great interest.
Internally, China was also reeling from the disastrous effects of the Great Leap Forward—economic collapse and famine—and growing political intrigue brought about by the Cultural Revolution’s numerous purges of the Chinese political structure. Against this backdrop of heightened tension on the domestic and international fronts, prominent leaders such as Minister of National Defense Lin Biao insisted that China maintain hawkish relations toward both the Soviets and the United States. Lin perceived both the United States and Soviet Union as imperial powers that threatened Chinese interests, standing in contrast to Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai’s efforts to pursue diplomatic ties with the United States to counterbalance Soviet hostility.
However, Lin’s death in 1971 in a suspicious plane crash cleared the way for China’s leadership class to pursue a rapprochement with the United States. Shortly thereafter, China’s positive overtures to the United States culminated in President Richard Nixon’s historic visit in 1972. In turn, the “Chimerica” project was forged with China as the workshop of the world in the liberal economic order.
However, this arrangement in the international order would begin to disintegrate after the United States prosecuted unpopular nation-building ventures in the Middle East and was at the center of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. This series of events discredited the U.S.-led liberal order among many of the resurging actors on the world stage such as China and Russia. The United States’ penchant for being “agreement incapable” on issues regarding NATO expansion and the Iran nuclear deal lent further credence to the idea that Washington is an erratic diplomatic actor that can’t be trusted to abide by international norms.
As the forces of nationalism and great power competition returned, the very notion of the preeminent powers of the Eurasian plane submitting to the whims of DC seemed fantastical at best. The previously mentioned intricacies of Cold War geopolitics and the United States’ bungled economic and foreign policies of the past three decades makes the realization of a “reverse Nixon” strategy a pipe dream at best. Dialing down tensions with Russia is fine but it should be done without ulterior motives.
Perhaps the United States should start treating countries like Russia as normal political entities as opposed to geopolitical playthings for American strategists to exploit to their heart’s content.
