Ever since being named deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East, Michael DiMino has found himself in the crosshairs. On January 22, conservative talk radio host Mark Levin, citing a tweet condemning the former CIA analyst’s critique of the “ironclad U.S.-Israel relationship,” called DiMino a “Biden regime reprobate.” The following day, Matthew Kassel published a piece in Jewish Insider framing DiMino, along with defense policy advisor Dan Caldwell and undersecretary of defense for policy nominee Elbridge Colby, as isolationists.

Such opposition is to be expected. Over the years, some of Donald Trump’s closest advisors have been officials with militaristic foreign policy inclinations. His first secretary of defense was James Mattis, his second secretary of state was Mike Pompeo, and his third national security advisor was John Bolton. His second administration already includes figures like Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Michael Waltz. And some of Trump’s biggest supporters in the Senate, such as Lindsey Graham, Tom Cotton, and Ted Cruz are unapologetic supporters of conventional foreign policy doctrines. It was only a matter of time before Trump’s most hawkish supporters came into conflict with those who are skeptical of U.S. military intervention, especially when it serves Israeli interests more than American ones.

But what does Michael DiMino actually believe? During an appearance on System Update with Glenn Greenwald in July, DiMino told guest host Michael Tracey:

“Iran is not an existential threat to the United States. Iran is a middle-tier threat to the United States, mostly as a result of the fact that the United States maintains 40,000 troops in the Middle East.”

He continued:

“If we’re going to complain about Iran’s influence in the Middle East growing exponentially over the last several decades, we have nobody to blame but U.S. foreign policy. Love or hate Saddam Hussein, he was the biggest regional counterbalance to Iran…And of course, the United States went in in 2003 and overthrew Saddam, and we had a total power vacuum that was filled first with ISIS and then was filled with these Shia militia groups that did most of the fighting against ISIS and now basically control Iraq.”

That same month, DiMino criticized the Israeli assassinations of Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr and Hamas chairman Ismail Haniyeh, claiming that they were “likely to spur further escalation that may draw the United States into yet another war in the Middle East.” He urged policymakers to “do everything possible to prevent the outbreak of a full-scale regional war,” adding that such a conflict “would not serve the security interests of the United States, Israel, or the world.” In October, he accurately characterized Iran’s ballistic missile strike on Israel as “fairly moderate” and cautioned Israel against attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Of course, DiMino’s greatest crime may be his belief that the United Stats has a right to make demands of Israel, a foreign country it has bankrolled to the tune of nearly $18 billion since the Hamas-led terrorist attacks on October 7, 2023. Last January, he criticized the Joe Biden administration for failing to apply “increased diplomatic pressure on the Israeli government to allow more aid into Gaza.” DiMino argued that such a strategy would discourage the Houthi movement from attacking Red Sea shipping lanes, all while preventing “indefinite U.S. participation in a broader regional war.”

Elsewhere, DiMino has written about the folly of U.S. involvement in Ukraine. In June, he rejected the notion that more military aid would make a meaningful difference in the conflict. Instead, he blamed Ukraine’s lack of progress on four factors: “[A]n endemic manpower shortage, an inability to generate offensive combat power, diminishing returns on a litany of supposed ‘game-changing’ Western weapons, and poor tactics.” Recognizing that Ukraine “cannot reclaim all of its occupied territory via military force,” he urged the Biden administration to initiate peace talks.

For all of Trump’s talk about putting America first, he has yet to realize a foreign policy that accomplishes that goal. Contrary to popular belief, the first Trump administration was not an antiwar one. In 2017, the Defense Department enacted a relaxation of the U.S. military’s rules of engagement for airstrikes. This policy resulted in a 330% increase in the number of Afghan civilians killed during his time in office. In fact, Trump presided over the deadliest year of the war in Afghanistan; in 2019, U.S. airstrikes killed 700 civilians. That same year, Trump sided with John Bolton and vetoed a resolution that would have ended U.S. participation in the Saudi war in Yemen. At that point, the famine resulting from that conflict had already killed 85,000 children. The first Trump administration also approved the sale of Javelin missiles to Ukraine and failed to withdraw all remaining U.S. troops from Iraq and Syria.

In the three weeks since his return to the White House, Trump has indicated a willingness to “take over” the Gaza Strip and forcibly relocate its Palestinian population. Despite opposition from many of the hostages’ families, he has threatened to upend the tentative ceasefire between Israel and Hamas if Hamas does not release the remaining hostages by Saturday. Days after Trump’s meeting with Benjamin Netanyahu, his State Department approved the sale of $8.4 billion in Hellfire missiles, bombs, guidance kits, and artillery shells to Israel. He also failed to deliver on his promise to end the war between Russia and Ukraine within twenty-four hours of taking office.

The DiMino controversy underscores the tension at the heart of the ideological struggle between the two factions that purport to represent the America First movement. One side consists of national security hawks who have successfully rebranded as Trump loyalists. The other consists of non-interventionists who favor a more realistic and restrained approach to U.S. military intervention. It will be impossible for a second Trump administration to realize a transformational foreign policy legacy if it makes concessions to the militarists it counts among its ranks.