The British Army is in the same crisis mode as the Royal Navy; they’re a post-imperial military basket case that could not fight an invasion of Sports Illustrated swimsuit models. They would be defeated.

Across the board with the possible exception of the vaunted Special Air Service and the Royal Marines, the British military project is a shambles. It can’t float submarines that do the right thing, it can’t deploy its conventional-fueled aircraft carriers and it has experienced a steady decline in manpower across the board.

Per the Ajax Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV):

Health & Safety Issues (Vibration & Noise):

Hearing Damage: Excessive noise levels led to hearing loss and injuries in soldiers, requiring double ear protection.
Sickness & Injury: Crews experienced vomiting, disorientation, and violent shaking, with some needing long-term medical care.
Operational Limits: Restrictions were placed on speed (20 mph) and time in the vehicle (90 mins) due to vibration.

Mechanical & Design Failures:

Reversing: Inability to reverse over obstacles higher than 20cm (that’s eight inches).
Turret/Gun: Problems with the turret and gun systems.
Rear Ramp: Electronic failure and lack of a manual quick-release, taking 15 mins to open.
Power: Onboard batteries can’t support routine operation; frequent Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) breakdowns.
Fuel Tanks: Issues requiring manual fuel transfer

Not only is the Ajax IFV a loser in budgeting, it actually makes soldiers sick through excessive vibration and has the reliability of a used Yugo. As a result, the United Kingdom has effectively found itself without a tracked IFV, as the aging Warrior fleet is already being prepared for retirement.

Looking ahead, the Ajax saga highlights systemic challenges in UK defence acquisition: over-reliance on complex, bespoke systems amid budget constraints and evolving threats. While General Dynamics insists modifications since 2023—such as enhanced vibration isolators and improved cabin insulation—have mitigated risks, real-world exercises like Iron Fist expose gaps between lab tests and operational stress. For the soldiers affected, the human cost is stark; some face potential medical discharge despite ministerial claims of safety. As the UK commits £75 billion annually to defence under the 2025 Strategic Defence Review, Ajax’s fate could influence future investments, perhaps tilting toward hybrid manned-unmanned fleets inspired by Ukrainian innovations. Ultimately, restoring trust will require transparency: full disclosure of trial data, crew feedback integration, and a clear path to FOC without further bloodshed. Only then can Ajax fulfil its role as a cornerstone of British armoured reconnaissance, safeguarding troops on tomorrow’s battlefields.

I look forward to seeing the published trial data.

https://www.defensemagazine.com/article/british-mod-pauses-troubled-ajax-programme-amid-fears-of-long-term-crew-harm

Concerns also extend to other components of the IFV. The onboard battery reportedly cannot support even routine operation, while the auxiliary power unit, intended to compensate for this limitation, suffers frequent breakdowns. Consequently, troops reportedly have to carry backpack batteries even during training, significantly limiting their operational capabilities.

Fuel tanks have also reportedly failed, requiring manual fuel transfer between vehicles. In addition, water and other fluids reportedly accumulate inside hull cavities, to the point that one could literally “wash their hands” inside the vehicle. Draining these fluids then becomes a serious challenge.

This is just the tip of the iceberg of what is wrong with this unreliable and inoperable IFV.

https://en.defence-ua.com/industries/falling_apart_on_the_move_how_the_ajax_ifv_turned_into_britains_most_problematic_armored_vehicle-16806.html

Two F-35B Lightning II aircraft from the F-35 Integrated Test Force (ITF) successfully landed onboard HMS Queen Elizabeth on 1 November 2018 marking the beginning of the second phase of Development Testing (DT-2) of first-of-class flying trials (FOCFT).  Maj Michael ‘Latch’ Lippert, USMC landed first in BF-04 and was followed by Mr. Peter ‘Wizzer’ Wilson in BF-05. Both ITF test pilots are based at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland. (RELEASED / U.S. Navy Photograph by Liz Wolter)

So pardon me for a rather technical discussion that points out yet another flaw in the haunted and ridiculously poorly performing F35 program.

Why was Shipborne Rolling Vertical Landing (SRVL) EXTREMELY important for the UK carriers?

The SRVL capability needs as little as 10% of the F-35B entire fuel capacity during the landing process. During SRVL, the F-35B nose is pitched up and the fighter glides to a landing by friction on wheels only, with no outside assistance. As good as this capability is at conserving fuel, it is very difficult and dangerous, there is no guarantee SRVL will work with high crosswinds, micro-bursts or in bad weather, the F-35B landing on a wet flight deck may just slip off the other end. The Royal Navy (RN) has been testing SRVL for over seven years and couldn’t get it to combat ready status, so they decided to cut it.

Vertical landing (hover mode landing straight down) on the other hand is extremely fuel inefficient, it takes 60 to 90 seconds for F-35B to stay in hover mode and land slowly. This burns as much as 2700kg of fuel, that’s 32% of the entire fuel capacity of the F-35B.

Which means that without SRVL capabilities the already short combat radius of the F-35B will be cut from approx 900km to 600km (depending on payload and takeoff load it could be less). This means the RN will be forced to use the F-35B not as carrier air-wings fighting for air dominance, rather like how the USMC use them, as expensive short range ground support aircraft. Keep in mind that all carrier flotilla must devote some of their fighter strength to a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) and a Barrier Combat Air Patrol (BCAP) which are the two air loiter perimeters to defend the carrier flotilla.Not to mention the British naval aviators will have to drop all unused bombs and missiles into the sea before landing, which can cost millions every time they land. This will disincentivize UK carrier aviators from flying with real bombs and missiles during training.And during situations where combat is not guaranteed, that’s the quickest way to deplete your munitions.

This means that the two British carriers are even more useless than anyone thought.

For the Navy, perhaps the next most significant line in the accounts is the Rolling Vertical Landing upgrade cancellation. This implies that HMS Queen Elizabeth will not receive the Bedford Array in her current refit as previously announced. This is a lighting system that F-35 pilots would use to guide them safely onto the deck while performing the demanding Shipborne Rolling Vertical Landing (SRVL) manoeuvre.

Instead of landing vertically as normal, during SRVL, the aircraft approaches the ship directly from behind at relatively low speed. A combination of thrust from its nozzle and lift-fan and lift created by air over the wings allows it to land with up to 7000lbs greater all-up weight (UAW). Without SRVL capability, the F-35B would be forced to ditch some or all of the unused fuel and weapons when returning to the ship. Fuel is a precious resource and munitions are expensive. For example, a single AIM-120D AMRAAM missile costs around £2.4M. With limited stocks and such a price tag, not something you want to casually jettison into the sea if unused.

Only around £309,000 has apparently been written off by this cancellation. The RN has already made efforts in early development trials of SRVL, but there appears to have been little progress since a second modest round of developmental test flights in 2023. It is possible that funding for further SRVL development has been redirected, for now at least, into the hybrid carrier wing, which may now assume greater priority than operational SRVL capability. Reconfiguring the flight deck to varying degrees may be required for UAVs and it may be prudent to postpone the installation of SRVL-related landing aids until the way forward is more settled.

In the end, this is yet another example of not extrapolating the possible effects of technology development getting well ahead of the possible and making promises that when not fulfilled threaten the efficacy of the entire enterprise.

Here is a very good report on the failure of Joint Programs.

Sunk costs – MoD accounts reveal cancelled Royal Navy projects

A near miss by millimeters, a sniper who waited, and a teenager’s digital footprint that should have set off alarms—our conversation with investigative reporter Ken Silva digs into the attempted assassinations against Donald Trump, the shooting of Charlie Kirk, and the enduring mystery of the January 6 pipe bombs. We trace what the investigations missed, where the public record contradicts official lines, and how secrecy fuels the very conspiracies authorities claim to fight.

We start with Butler: the rooftop angle outside a tight 150‑yard perimeter, the lack of snipers on a usable roof, and a timeline that shows a local officer interrupting the barrage before the final shot. Ken walks through newly surfaced Google account data tied to Thomas Crooks, revealing a pivot from pro‑Trump postings to violent fantasies during COVID—material that raises an uncomfortable question: how did nobody in law enforcement catch this? We also examine the autopsy and toxicology gaps that keep open basic questions about the shooter’s state of mind.

From there, we move to the Charlie Kirk case. The alleged shooter, Tyler Robinson, reportedly confessed to his father, but controversy remains over ballistics, surveillance footage that hasn’t been released, and gag orders that limit public scrutiny. The vantage point appears so precise that it implies prior scouting or help. When critical records stay sealed, speculation thrives. Ken outlines what evidence would close those loops without compromising a fair trial.

Finally, we revisit the January 6 pipe bombs: conflicting timelines, a Secret Service sweep that didn’t prevent a device from being found near the DNC while Kamala Harris was present, and the operational effect of drawing resources at the worst possible moment. Gait analysis claiming to out the suspect may intrigue, but it’s not enough to name a culprit. The common thread across all three stories is the need for disciplined transparency—release the timelines, the raw footage, the forensics—and the courage to admit when procedures failed.

If this kind of clear‑eyed scrutiny matters to you, follow the show, share this episode with a friend who wants facts over noise, and leave a review with the one question you want answered next. Your feedback shapes where we dig next.

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What happens when conscience collides with command? We dig into the duty to refuse illegal orders, why “just following orders” isn’t a shield under U.S. military law, and how real-world pressures push service members toward compliance even when red flags are waving. Drawing on the Nuremberg legacy and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, we lay out the reasonable person standard, the gray zones operators face, and the information gaps created by tempo, classification, and deference to the chain of command.

The debate isn’t abstract. We tackle drone strikes and maritime interdictions that occur far from declared battlefields, where targets are labeled threats without due process and legality is assumed rather than tested. We also unpack the political firestorm around lawmakers telling troops to refuse unlawful orders, the backlash from prominent figures in Washington, and why specificity matters if you want to help real people making life-or-death choices under orders.

From there, we turn to Gaza and the West Bank, mapping how a “truce” can mask a harder reality on the ground: concentrated control of land and water, constrained aid, and an approach to settlement and displacement designed to be incremental and quiet rather than spectacular and condemned. We examine the strategic logic behind slow-motion annexation, the global signals that enable it, and the human consequences that follow—especially for families facing medical collapse and shrinking horizons.

It all connects to a single theme: accountability. A credible military requires lawful orders and the courage to refuse unlawful ones. A sustainable foreign policy demands consistency between values and actions. If this conversation challenged your assumptions or gave you a clearer framework for thinking about duty, law, and Gaza, share it with a friend, subscribe for future episodes, and leave a review with the one question you still want answered.

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I suspect the Israeli military force losses are even greater than they let on.

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) last won a war in 1973; everything else has been a stalemate or a near-run defeat. This latest massacre machine against defenseless humans may be the last gasp of an always overestimated military entity.

During two years of Israel’s genocidal war in Gaza, the military lost 923 troops and saw 6,399 wounded, while roughly 20,000 soldiers suffer from post-traumatic stress, according to Israeli media citing army data.

Under heavy military censorship, the army faces accusations of concealing higher losses to preserve morale.

Brik wrote that many officers sought immediate discharge and younger recruits refused to sign long-term contracts, creating a wide shortage of professional staff across the military.

The IDF is not the vaunted war machine they advertsie themselves as.

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/israeli-army-faces-worst-manpower-crisis-in-its-history-general-says/3758424