The Fed’s Massive Injection of ‘Liquidity’ Also Benefits Uncle Sam

The Fed’s Massive Injection of ‘Liquidity’ Also Benefits Uncle Sam

There’s a lot to be said regarding the Fed’s surprise announcements—including its Sunday surprise of $700 billion in renewed QE and the complete elimination of all reserve requirements for banks—but here let me just focus on one element: the tendency for Fed officials and all the pundits to treat injections of “liquidity” as if they don’t count as much when distorting the economy. I’ve seen some analysts literally call the Fed’s repo operations “free” as opposed to fiscal policy, which they agree actually costs something.

These distinctions are phony. The Fed’s $1.5 trillion was a “handout” in the same way that a Pentagon fighter jet contract is a handout to a defense contractor. However, the defenders of the Fed are correct that financial institutions per se are not reaping extraordinary gains from the new policy. No, the primary beneficiaries of the Fed’s recent announcements are the holders of US Treasury debt (which includesinvestment banks, of course), as well as the US Treasury, which, after all, is the institution that issues new Treasury debt. The Fed’s massive wave of intended dollar-creation is designed to keep the liquidity of US government-issued debt close to par with US government-issued money.

Just think slowly through what the repo market is: it’s a market where firms sell their Treasury (or other very safe collateral) securities in exchange for actual dollars but also agree contractually to “repurchase” (hence the name) these Treasurys after a certain time. Now, there is an inbuilt (slight) difference in the sell/buy price, allowing the implicit lender of money to earn a return on it.

Especially for overnight loans of cash, the short-term repo market seems to be very secure lending. After all, the party advancing cash gets to hold on to the Treasury securities as collateral. Specifically, if the other party that needed the cash ends up being unable to repurchase the Treasurys, then the party that lent the money at least gets to keep them as compensation for the contractual default. So, the lender either (a) gets his cash back with interest or (b) gets to keep the Treasury securities.

Now what the Fed announced last week is that it will itself enter the repo market and be prepared to offer up to $1.5 trillion in (newly created) US dollars in order to allow institutions to pledge their Treasurys as collateral and borrow such vast sums. But these transactions won’t be overnight loans; instead, the $1.5 trillion consists of $500 billion bursts of financing in the one-month and three-month repo contracts.

The whole point of this Fed intervention was to keep the implicit interest rate in the Treasury repo market down to acceptable levels. In other words, if the Fed had not intervened, then repo rates would have soared. Remember, last September the repo rate suddenly jumped from about 2.2 percent to 6 percent in two days. That was deemed a crisis at the time, justifying the Fed’s large (and recently expanded) ongoing intervention in the repo markets.

It’s true that when fear grips the world, investors do look to US government debt as a “safe haven.” That’s why US government bond yields collapsed to record lows recently and stock markets are falling: many portfolio managers are switching from equity to fixed-income assets.

But what the spikes in the repo market reveal is that in the very short term, such as a period of 1–90 days, actual cash is king. Right now, asset managers do not at all view a Treasury security “as almost the same thing” as US dollars issued by the Federal Reserve. One way the market communicates such a change in risk appetites is a “skyrocketing” implicit interest rate in the Treasury repo market. People who control actual US cash right now are not as willing to see that transformed into an “equivalent” amount of Treasurys, and so they demand a higher compensation (interest return) to make the asset swap. This is the market process that the Fed is trying desperately to hammer away.

By announcing that it is willing to throw up to $1.5 trillion in electronically created money in order to give three-month loans to those institutions that have bought Treasury debt, the Fed is bailing out not only the holders of Treasury debt, but also the Treasury itself. The Fed is ensuring a healthy demand—now and in the perceived future—for Treasurys, since now private bond dealers won’t worry about a sudden change in liquidity for their asset.

If the Fed bought $1.5 trillion in military hardware, everybody would instantly recognize it as a gift to the defense contractors and their main suppliers, including assembly workers (who might live in the state of a politician who voted for the spending bill). Likewise, when the Fed announces $1.5 trillion in new financing available for a certain portion of the financial sector, it is a gift to those institutions and their suppliers, such as the Treasury Department which has run up the debt by an additional $1.1 trillion in the last twelve months.

Reprinted from the Independent Institute.

The Theory and Brief History of Money and Banking

The Theory and Brief History of Money and Banking

The ultimate purpose of this booklet is to give the reader a solid grasp of how money works in today’s world. Yet before diving into the particulars of central banks, repo markets, and LIBOR—all topics that will be covered in future chapters—we should first provide a general framework giving the basic theory or “economic logic” of money and banking.

In short: why do we have money in the first place? Where does it come from, and what determines its form (livestock, metal ingots, coins, paper notes, electronic ledger entries, etc.)? What qualities make for a good money? What role do banks play—is it something other than what money itself does for us?

In this chapter, we’ll answer these elementary yet essential questions. To be clear, we are not here offering an actual history lesson, though we do mention some important historical episodes and illustrative examples. Rather we are providing a mental framework for understanding everything else that follows in the booklet.

The Limits of Direct Exchange

To understand the importance of money, let’s first imagine a society without money. In a world limited to barter, or what economists more precisely call direct exchange, there would still be private property and people would still benefit from voluntary trade. Because economic value is subjective—the “utility” of a good is in the eye (or mind) of the beholder—we can have win-win exchanges, in which both parties walk away correctly believing that they got the better end of the deal.

However, if society were limited to direct exchange—in which individuals only accept items in trade that they plan on using personally—then people would miss out on many advantageous transactions. Let’s consider a simplistic example. Suppose there are three individuals: a farmer, a butcher, and a cobbler. The farmer starts out with some eggs that he’s just taken from his hens. He would like to trade his eggs in order to get his tattered shoes repaired. The problem, though, is that the cobbler doesn’t want any eggs—but he would be willing to repair the shoes for bacon.

Unfortunately, the farmer doesn’t currently have bacon. However, his neighbor the butcher does have bacon. Yet the butcher doesn’t want to trade with the cobbler, because the butcher’s shoes are just fine. What the butcher would really like are some eggs. Yet, the farmer himself doesn’t like the taste of bacon, and would rather eat his own eggs.

In a world limited to direct exchange, these men are at an impasse, because no single transaction would benefit any pair of them. Yet all of them could improve their situation with a rearrangement of the goods.

The solution is to introduce indirect exchange, in which at least one person accepts an item in trade that he doesn’t plan on using himself but holds merely to trade away again in the future. In our example, suppose that the farmer has an epiphany: Even though he personally dislikes its taste, he trades his eggs to the butcher to obtain the bacon. Then he takes the bacon to the cobbler, who accepts it as payment for fixing his tattered shoes.

direct exchange diagram

After these two trades, all three individuals are better off than they were originally. Remember, though, that the solution relied on the farmer accepting an item in trade—in this case the bacon—that he didn’t plan on using himself. Economists call such a good a medium of exchange. Just as air is a “medium” through which sound waves travel, the bacon served as a medium through which the farmer’s ultimate exchange was effected—namely giving up his eggs in order to receive shoe-repair services.

Media of Exchange and the Origin of Money

As our fable illustrated, individuals can often improve their position by trading away goods that are less marketable and accepting goods that are more marketable, even if they don’t personally plan on using the items. As the founder of the Austrian school, Carl Menger, demonstrated in an 1892 essay1 (though earlier economists had anticipated some of the explanation), this principle is all we need to explain the emergence of money.

As individuals in the community seek to trade away their less marketable (or less liquid) goods in exchange for more marketable (or more liquid) goods, a snowball process is set in motion: those goods that started out with a wide appeal based on their intrinsic qualities see a boost in their popularity simply because they are so popular. (For a more modern example, the prisoners in a World War II POW camp would gladly trade away their rations in exchange for cigarettes even if they were nonsmokers, because enough of the other prisoners were smokers.2) Eventually, one or two commodities become so popular that just about everyone in the community would be willing to accept them in trade. At that point, money has been born.

A formal definition for money is that it’s a universally accepted medium of exchange. Menger’s explanation showed how such a commodity could emerge from its peers merely through voluntary transactions and without any individual seeing the big picture or trying to “invent” money. (See the endnotes for recent anthropological criticism of Mengerian-type explanations of the origin of money.3)

The Qualities of a Good (Commodity) Money

Money that emerged in the process we’ve described would necessarily be commodity money, in which the monetary good itself is also a regular commodity. (In Chapter 3 we will discuss fiat money, in which the monetary good serves no other function than to be the money.) Historically, many types of commodities have served as money in various regions, including livestock, shells, tobacco, and of course the precious metals gold and silver.

What would make a community gravitate towards some commodities but not others? Besides having a wide marketability, an individual would want a medium of exchange to possess the following qualities: ease of transport, durability, divisibility, homogeneity, and convenient size and weight for the intended transactions.

In our fable above, although bacon served as the medium of exchange, it would be ill-suited to serve this purpose generally, as bacon is perishable. Likewise, a shotgun might be very valuable in certain communities, but it’s not divisible; you can’t cut it in half to “make change.” Diamonds might seem like a great candidate for a medium of exchange, but they aren’t homogeneous: one giant diamond is more valuable than five smaller diamonds that (combined) weigh the same amount.

These types of considerations help explain why eventually gold and silver emerged as the market’s commodity monies of choice. These precious metals satisfied all of the criteria of what makes a convenient medium of exchange, and once the community generally agreed, they were money.

Monetary Calculation

The emergence of money meant that a single commodity was on one side of every transaction. This greatly reduced the calculations required to navigate the marketplace. For example, consider a merchant whose business required him to closely follow twenty different goods. In a world of pure barter—where each good traded directly against every other good—in principle he would have to keep track of 190 separate barter “prices”4 (meaning the ratios at which one good traded for another). But if one of those twenty goods also serves as the monetary good—maybe it’s silver—then the merchant only needs to keep track of nineteen different prices (all quoted in silver), because each of the other goods is always being bought and sold against silver.

Moving from a state of barter to a monetary economy allows for economic decisions to be appraised in terms of a standard unit. With the use of money, business owners can engage in accounting, where they can easily calculate whether they had a profitable year. Trying to compare revenues to expenses would be much more difficult in a pure barter system. A factory owner could know that her operation used up certain quantities of hundreds of input commodities (including labor hours), in order to produce certain quantities of dozens of outputs, but without being able to reckon these physically distinct commodities in terms of money prices, she would face the same type of problem plaguing socialist central planners.5

The Function of Monetary Coins (and Tokens)

We have seen how a commodity money can emerge spontaneously from a prior state of barter, facilitating exchanges and profit/loss calculations. However, even though a community benefits tremendously from the existence of money, there would still be limitations if the money remained in its “raw” form. It would hamper trade if shopkeepers had to perform metallurgical tests on hunks of metal that customers presented for payment to verify that the hunks were indeed silver (or gold, etc.) of the claimed weight.

The solution to this problem is to coin the raw hunks of metal into recognizable disks of a uniform size and purity (or “fineness”). We should emphasize that a full-bodied coin was not money because of the stamping process; the markings on the coin merely indicated to the community that the hunk of metal in question did indeed contain the specified weight in the underlying commodity that served as money.

In addition to striking full-bodied coins, another possible solution is for reputable outlets to issue token coins, which represent redemption claims on the issuer for a specified amount of the actual money commodity. Note that to perform their function well, even token coins would need to be recognizable in the community and difficult to counterfeit. For a modern example, consider the plastic chips issued by casinos: A Las Vegas casino needs to have chips that are distinctive and “authentic”-looking, and which can’t be easy for outsiders to replicate. Because such chips will be instantly redeemed by the casino, within its walls (and even perhaps in the surrounding neighborhood) they are “as good as money.” But a gambler who travels back home wouldn’t be able to buy groceries with chips issued from a Las Vegas casino.

Just as the money itself can arise without the intervention of political authorities, so too can the private sector handle the operations of turning the commodity money into coins. Indeed, numismatists agree that some of the highest-quality coins (and tokens) ever produced originated in eighteenth-century Britain from private mints.

The full story is too long to tell here,6 but the quick version is that the British Royal Mint had utterly failed to provide the common people with coins that could serve their needs for everyday commerce, and regulations prohibited banks from issuing notes in small denominations. As a result, employers resorted to various inconvenient remedies, including paying their workers in waves (so that, say, the first third of the employees would spend their new wages in town, after which the employers could then collect the coins in order to pay the second third of their workers, etc.) and making arrangements with the local tavern owners so that the workers’ beer tabs would effectively reduce the wages they were owed. The shortage of government-produced coinage was so severe that even obviously counterfeit coins were tolerated because bad money was better than no money at all.

In this intolerable situation, Thomas Williams, the principal owner of the giant Parys copper mine, hit upon the bright idea of installing a commercial-scale mint on the premises. He then struck (token) coins out of the copper with instructions on where they could be redeemed for money, and paid his workers—the ones actually mining the copper—with these token coins. Soon afterwards Matthew Boulton, famous for his collaboration with James Watt in the refinement of the modern steam engine, followed suit with the privately owned Soho Mint, where he was the first to implement a process of using steam power to mass-produce exquisite coinage. The following photos exhibit the remarkable craftsmanship of the privately struck coins and tokens from this era.7

Peck 1075 Coin
 A Penny from a Soho Mint 1797 pattern striking. Photo Credit: Bill McKivor, The Copper Corner.
Promissory Half Penny 1791
 A 1791 token promising a half-penny to the bearer. Photo Credit: Bill McKivor, The Copper Corner.

The Function and Origin of Banks

Even in a community with a commodity money stamped into high-quality coins, there would still be limitations on commerce. For example, wealthy individuals would be nervous about holding vast sums of gold or silver in their homes where they would be vulnerable to theft, and it would be inconvenient to transport large amounts of coin or bullion for every transaction involving a significant purchase price.

bank solves these problems by providing a secure location where members of the community can store their excess supplies of money. (The other main function of banks is to serve as credit intermediaries, which act as a conduit between borrowers and savers.) The goldsmith was a logical person to also act as banker, because his business already involved storing stockpiles of gold. It was easy enough for members of the community to deposit coins with the goldsmith in exchange for an official receipt indicating how much of the money commodity they (the depositors) had stored with him.

Exchange Gold for Promissory Note Diagram

The reason a booklet on the mechanics of money must also cover banking is that—to put it bluntly—banks enjoy the legal ability to create money. In Chapter 5 we will explain this process in much greater detail, but for now let us quote the Chicago Federal Reserve on the historical origins (at least in England) of this practice:

[B]anks can build up deposits by increasing loans and investments so long as they keep enough currency on hand to redeem whatever amounts the holders of deposits want to convert into currency. This unique attribute of the banking business was discovered many centuries ago.

It started with goldsmiths. As early bankers, they initially provided safekeeping services, making a profit from vault storage fees for gold and coins deposited with them. People would redeem their “deposit receipts” whenever they needed gold or coins to purchase something, and physically take the gold or coins to the seller who, in turn, would deposit them for safekeeping, often with the same banker. Everyone soon found that it was a lot easier simply to use the deposit receipts directly as a means of payment. These receipts, which became known as notes, were acceptable as money since whoever held them could go to the banker and exchange them for metallic money.

Then, bankers discovered that they could make loans merely by giving their promises to pay, or bank notes, to borrowers. In this way, banks began to create money. More notes could be issued than the gold and coin on hand because only a portion of the notes outstanding would be presented for payment at any one time. Enough metallic money had to be kept on hand, of course, to redeem whatever volume of notes was presented for payment. [Emphasis added.]8

Once the banker (such as the goldsmith) realized that his deposit receipts (“notes”) were treated by at least some members of the community as being “as good as money,” he could lend out some of the coins that his customers had deposited with him, even though the customers still held paper receipts entitling them to immediate redemption. The whole operation was viable so long as the banker always had enough coins on hand to satisfy whoever might show up to demand their deposits back.

Exchange Gold for Promissory Note Many Diagram

This booklet will focus on the mechanics and economic implications of the fact that banks have the legal ability to create money, but we’ll wrap up our historical sketch here with a note on the judicial treatment. If someone hands over an item for safekeeping in which the specific article is important—such as a college student placing her furniture in a storage unit for the summer, or a diner checking his coat when entering a restaurant—this is handled under bailment law. In such a situation, the person acting as a warehouser obtains physical possession but not legal ownership of the items in question, and is obligated to act as their custodian until the actual owner wishes to retrieve them. It would be a breach of contract for the manager of a storage facility to rent out the student’s couch, even if he had it safely back in her storage unit when she returned from summer break.

However, when the deposited items are fungible goods, such as wheat or oil, then the relationship is more nuanced. With such an “irregular deposit,” the depositor isn’t entitled to the specific physical items that were handed over for safekeeping, but instead merely expects to receive comparable items back. In the typical scenario, this is the type of deposit applicable to money; the people handing over coins to the goldsmith didn’t care about receiving back those particular coins, they merely wanted to be assured of obtaining the same number of comparable coins when they redeemed their deposit receipts (i.e., banknotes).

As a result of various court rulings, it is now standard to treat the deposit of money with a bank as a loan, so that the depositor becomes a creditor of the bank and the actual ownership of the money transfers to the banker, even for “demand deposits,” which are payable upon notice. Rightly or wrongly,9 it is this legal treatment that allowed the proverbial goldsmith to lend out some of the coins that his depositors had placed with him for safekeeping, and which allows modern banks to engage in “fractional reserve banking.” To reiterate, it is this practice by which banks can create (and destroy) money—a process that we will fully explain in Chapter 5.

We will close this chapter with an excerpt from an opinion issued by Lord Cottenham in the 1848 case Foley v. Hill and Others:

The money placed in the custody of a banker is, to all intents and purposes, the money of the banker, to do with as he pleases; he is guilty of no breach of trust in employing it; he is not answerable to the principal if he puts it into jeopardy, if he engages in a hazardous speculation; he is not bound to keep it or deal with it as the property of his principal; but he is, of course, answerable for the amount, because he has contracted.10

Judge Reading Ruling

Reprinted from the Mises Institute.

“Rules of Origin” Show Why Trade Agreements Aren’t Free Trade

“Rules of Origin” Show Why Trade Agreements Aren’t Free Trade

Ludwig von Mises famously argued that people must choose between outright socialism and unfettered capitalism, because there is no coherent “middle ground” between the two. The allegedly reasonable compromise of a highly interventionist state — where the authorities retain nominal private property but issue edicts regulating how legal owners may use their property — is unstable. Mises argued that one round of interventionism invites consequences that are even worse than the original problem, leading to yet more interventionism.

During the debates over Obamacare, I pointed out just how relevant Mises’s lesson was: we couldn’t get the “good parts” of Obamacare (such as universal coverage) without the “bad parts” (such as the individual mandate and massive tax hikes). When it comes to today’s controversies over trade with China, once again Mises’s insights are valuable. You can’t levy punitive tariffs on China but leave other trading routes relatively free, because then the Chinese will simply ship their exports via a more circuitous route. China hawks need to decide if they are going to abandon attempts to coercively manage trade, or if they are prepared for even more extensive top-down planning of global commerce.

Mises and Milk

Mises’s standard example for the phenomenon of one intervention leading to another was a price control on milk. Suppose the government wants to make milk more affordable for poor families. It can enact strict price controls on milk. But if this isolated price ceiling is imposed in the context of an otherwise free market economy, the immediate result will be a shortage of milk. Now, rather than poor families struggling to afford milk for their children, the stores won’t carry any milk, period. At this point, the government can either admit its error and retreat back to pure laissez-faire, or it can impose further price controls, this time on cattle feed etc. in order to coax dairy farmers into once again supplying the market with milk. Yet this second round of intervention leads to even more undesirable consequences, and so on.

Mises’s Lesson Applied to International Trade

In the debate over free trade, we see a similar phenomenon. The Trump administration has been engaged in a low-level trade war with China, levying targeted tariffs on its imports in an effort to bring Beijing to the bargaining table. Yet the remaining pockets of free(r) trade are stymying the effect, because of the phenomenon of “transshipment” — in which China exports its goods to a third country, from which they can be sold to the United States without penalty. As a recent article in the WSJ, entitled “American Tariffs on China Are Being Blunted by Trade Cheats,” pointed out,

Billions of dollars’ worth of China-made goods subject to tariffs by the Trump administration in its trade fight with Beijing are dodging the China levies by entering the U.S. via other countries in Asia, especially Vietnam, according to trade data and overseas officials.

And thus we see the relevance of Mises’s warning. The goal of the initial intervention — the levying of tariffs on Chinese imports — was to hurt Chinese exporters and thereby convince Chinese government officials to concede to American demands. But much of the intended effect has been muted because of transshipment.

At this point, American officials can admit that their approach was ill-advised, and stop using taxes as a way to make America great again. Or, they can expand the trade war with China to include an extensive monitoring of the content of goods coming from every other country on Earth.

“Rules of Origin” in Trade Agreements

This isn’t hyperbole on my part. As Ryan McMaken explained on this site over the summer, special trade agreements — such as the US pact with Central America — have clauses signifying that only qualified goods can escape duties. McMaken linked to this relevant passage from an FAQ on the CAFTA-DR (Central America-Dominican Republic-United States-Free Trade Agreement):

How can my product qualify to take advantage of the CAFTA-DR?

The product must qualify as an “originating” good under the terms of the Agreement. This means that the product must have sufficient U.S., Nicaraguan, Guatemalan, Honduran, Salvadoran, Costa Rican, and/or Dominican content or processing to meet the criteria of the Agreement. If goods contain only U.S. or Central American or Dominican Republic inputs, they qualify. If they contain some inputs from other countries, they still might qualify if they meet specific criteria set out in the Rules of Origin of the Agreement. Each product has a unique rule, based on its tariff classification. Most of the rules require either that the non-originating inputs undergo a specified transformation through processing in the United States or one or more of the other signatory countries (tariff shift method) and/or that they have a sufficient level of originating content as determined by a formula (regional value content method).

And now we see why a “free trade agreement” in practice isn’t simply an index card declaring, “Tariffs on Country X are 0 percent, three cheers for Bastiat!” These are managed trade agreements, with hundreds of pages devoted to detailed regulations that smack of top-down Soviet planning.

Conclusion

As Mises stressed time and again, people must decide whether to embrace capitalism or socialism. There is no third way, where we can enjoy the dynamism of markets while avoiding their “excesses” through strategic interventions. In the case of tariffs, particularly when the goal isn’t a broad-based revenue source but rather the achievement of a bargaining position with a particular country, a simple policy will soon break down, because the targeted country can simply ship its exports via other channels. (This same problem occurs in the case of “carbon tariffs” levied on countries that don’t punish greenhouse gas emitters to the same extent as the original country.)

The only logical end point is a country having to keep track of the entire network of trade flows, and levying the appropriate tariffs accordingly. Rather than this byzantine nightmare, trade hawks would be wiser to throw in the towel and try another strategy to achieve their goals. Unilateral free trade would make Americans richer, and our example might eventually inspire other governments to allow their own people more economic freedom as well.

Reprinted from the Mises Institute

Understanding Elizabeth Warren’s Radical Wealth Tax

Understanding Elizabeth Warren’s Radical Wealth Tax

Democratic presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren has had a long-standing call for a 2% wealth tax on any individuals with a net worth exceeding $50 million, and a 3% tax on wealth exceeding $1 billion. Yet when pressed on how to pay for her “Medicare for All” plan, Warren upped the ante to a 6% wealth tax for those fortunes exceeding $1 billion. (As I noted at the time of the announcement: If Warren doubles her wealth tax during the campaign, imagine how fast it will rise if she’s actually elected.)

Naturally, many conservative and libertarian analysts recoiled from such an economically destructive proposal. One of the ways critics used to illustrate the severity of Warren’s idea was to translate a wealth tax into an “equivalent” income tax on dividends, interest, and capital gains. But other economists pointed out problems with that line of attack, because after all, wealth and income are different things, and so taxes on them affect behavior differently. Wealth taxes are inefficient, no doubt about it, but not because “it’s the same thing as a huge income tax.” In the present piece I’ll try to referee the disputes and present the reader with an intuitive understanding of the issues involved.

How Wealth Taxes Can Correspond to Very High Income Taxes

In order to show that Warren’s seemingly modest 6% wealth tax was in fact quite radical, Richard Rubin at the Wall Street Journal warned that “Warren has unveiled sweeping tax proposals that would push federal tax rates on some billionaires and multimillionaires above 100%.” Likewise, Columbia University economist Wojciech Kopczuk—while commenting on the more academic proposal coming from economists Gabriel Zucman and Emmanual Saez—argued that“If you consider a safe rate of return of, say, 3%, a 3% wealth tax is a 103% tax on the corresponding capital income and a 6% tax rate is a 206% tax.”

Before proceeding, let’s illustrate Kopczuk’s argument with a numerical example. (Note that in the rest of this article, in my examples I’m going to use small amounts of wealth, such as $1,000, to keep the math simple. Warren’s actual proposals of course only apply to wealth exceeding $50 million and $1 billion—at least so far!)

Now then, suppose someone starts with $1,000 in wealth. If he consumes it, then he faces no wealth tax nor income tax. (Kopczuk adopts the convention that any wealth taxes are assessed on wealth at the end of the period, while income taxes are based on income generated during the period.)

However, suppose the individual invests the wealth in fairly safe bonds that yield a return of 3%. At the end of the period, the individual will have the original $1,000 plus the $30 in gross interest income, for a new level of wealth of $1,030. If that wealth is then taxed at 3%, the individual owes the IRS ($1,030 x 3%) = $31 (with rounding). Yikes! The income generated by that wealth was only $30 during the period, and so if the individual had the same liability from a income tax (applied to interest), then the “equivalent” tax rate would be 103%!

In General, a Wealth Tax Is Not Equivalent to an Income Tax

Although such calculations may be useful to wake up the average American to just how economically destructive even a “low” wealth tax may be, strictly speaking it is incorrect to argue that a wealth tax of x% is “equivalent to” or “the same thing as” a tax on capital income of y%. Over at EconLog, economists Scott Sumner and David R. Henderson both laid out some of the problems.

For our purposes, let me focus on Henderson’s commentary, where he showed the problem with Kopczuk’s analysis. Note, however, that in his actual example, Henderson ran the numbers for a 2% wealth tax. I’m going to change the calculations to make his same point, but using a 3% wealth tax, because I think that’s easier for the reader and also to be consistent with my commentary above:

The way to see what the marginal tax rate on capital income is[,] is to think on the margin: change the income from capital and see how much extra tax is paid.

So, for example, start with $1,000 at the start of the year that earns what Kopczuk calls the riskless rate of return, 3%. With a wealth tax, $1,030 at year’s end is taxed at [3%], leaving the owner with [97%] of $1,030, which is [$999.10].

Now raise the rate of return to 4%. With a wealth tax, $1,040 is taxed at [3%], leaving the owner with [97%] of $1,040, which is [$1,008.80].

How much more did the owner of capital net from the investment at 4% rather than at 3%? [$1,008.80] minus [$999.10], which is [$9.70]. In other words, for an extra income from capital of $10, the owner kept [$9.70]. The wealth tax amounted to a [3%] tax on the income from capital. [David R. Henderson, bold added, with bracketed numbers reflecting Murphy’s tweaking of the size of the wealth tax.]

As Henderson’s example shows, in general you can’t take a given wealth tax and then translate it into the “equivalent” income tax. In his example, if an investor has the choice between Investment A that is relatively safe and carries a return of 3%, and Investment B that is riskier but promises the higher expected return of 4%, then the wealth tax of 3% provides different incentives than a tax on capital income of 103%.

Specifically, under a 3% wealth tax, the investor who takes on the extra risk by switching to Investment B—trying to boost his gross rate of return from 3% to 4%, and hence his gross income on the investment from $30 to $40—will be able to keep 97% of that extra $10 in expected return on the investment.

In utter contrast, if the investor faces not a wealth tax, but instead a tax on capital income of 103%, then even if the riskier investment pays off as expected, the investor ends up worse off! Specifically, if he goes with Investment A our investor ends up with $1,030 gross on which he must pay ($30 x 103%) = $30.90 in income tax, leaving him with $999.10 after the dust settles. But if he goes with the riskier Investment B andeven if it pays off as he’d hoped, the investor ends up with $1,040 gross on which he must pay ($40 x 103%) = $41.20 in income tax, leaving him with $998.80 when the dust settles.

In summary, David R. Henderson has come up with a specific example to show why it’s wrong to argue that a wealth tax of 3% is “equivalent to” a capital income tax of 103%. If we assume an investor has the option of putting his wealth into a riskier investment with a higher rate of return, then the 3% wealth tax only distorts the decision by 3% (loosely speaking). If the risker investment pays out, then the investor’s upside is only clipped by the modest 3% tax on the extra wealth he now holds. In contrast, under a 103% income tax, then it would be insane for the individual to even consider the riskier asset. Perversely, the more it pays out, the worse off the investor ends up, because the government assesses a tax that is proportional to, but bigger than, any gains.

At this point, we see that wealth and income taxes can have very different effects on investor behavior. Generally speaking, if we are considering long-term deployments of financial capital, and comparing it to a no-tax baseline, a modest wealth tax will lead investors to seek riskier assets earning higher (expected) rates of return, while a very high capital income tax will lead investors to tread water, putting their wealth into safe assets that earn very low rates of return. Both types of taxes distort financial decisions, but they do so in different ways. They aren’t “equivalent” in general.

Still Not the Full Story

My apologies dear reader, but we’re not done yet: Henderson’s analysis isn’t the full story, either. Strictly speaking, what he showed is that under a wealth tax of 3%, an investor who consumes all of his wealth at the end of the period only faces a marginal income tax rate of 3%. Yet in practice, most investors probably aren’t planning on consuming everything in one fell swoop, and so Henderson has led readers to understate the economic impact of a wealth tax.

Recall the example: An investor who switches his $1,000 in capital from an asset yielding 3% to one that yields 4% will see his gross income jump from $30 to $40. Henderson reasoned that under a wealth tax of 3%, the investor got to retain $9.70 of the extra $10 in gross income, and concluded that the marginal income tax rate was therefore only 3%. (A reminder to avoid confusion: In order to keep the analysis comparable to the quotation from Kopczuk, I amended Henderson’s numbers to deal with a 3% wealth tax rather than a 2% version.)

Yet to repeat, this is only true if the investor consumes that $9.70. If instead the investor holds it another period, then it will trigger a second tax liability under the wealth tax, this time of ($9.70 x 3%) = 29 cents. And then if the investor carries the balance forward yet again, at the end of the third year he must pay another ($9.41 x 3%) = 28 cents in wealth tax. In contrast, under an income tax regime, if the investor just sits on his after-tax wealth after he earns it the first year, rather than deploying it to earn new income, then he owes no more additional tax on it.

In short, if our hypothetical investor had long-term plans for his wealth, then Henderson underestimated the burden of the wealth tax. In the limit, if the investor earned a one-shot return of $10 and then put it somewhere earning no return, it would asymptotically approach $0 over the years, as the government kept nibbling 3% annually at it. (For example, after 20 years of getting hit with the wealth tax, the original $10 in extra interest income earned that first year would have been whittled down to about $5.44.)

Let’s do one last example to illustrate the subtleties involved. Suppose our investor earned that extra $10 during this year (by moving his $1,000 into an asset that yielded 4% rather than 3%), and then wants to put the $10 under his mattress, where he intends to keep it for 50 years. How then would this extra $10 he earned this year, affect his long-term tax liability? Well, at the end of the first year he owes 30 cents. At the end of the second year he owes 29 cents on the remainder, and at the end of (say) the 25th year he owes 14 cents. However, when computing the burden from today’s perspective, those future tax payments need to be discounted. Since Kopczuk and Henderson both assumed a “safe” return of 3%, we can use that for a discount rate. (For example, the 14-cent wealth tax liability due in 25 years only has a present discounted value to our individual of 7 cents.)

Using this approach, the total wealth tax (in present-dollar terms) that the incremental $10 in wealth will cause our investor, over a 50-year time horizon, is some $4.89. In that sense, then, when our investor is considering whether to rearrange his portfolio in order to earn an extra $10, he faces a “marginal income tax rate” of about 49%.

Another way of showing the issue is to assume our investor wants to set aside a portion of his initial $10 in extra wealth, in order to cover all of the future wealth tax payments over the 50-year horizon. If he puts his earmarked “sinking tax fund” wealth into the relatively safe asset yielding 3%, then the investor must allocate $6.01 of his initial $10, just to cover the future wealth tax payments. Using this approach, the investor could understandably conclude that of his $10 in gross earnings—since he could only put $3.99 under the mattress “free and clear” for use in 50 years—he effectively paid the equivalent of a 60.1% marginal income tax rate.

Conclusion

Putting aside the moral problems with taxation—it’s theft, as a popular libertarian slogan reminds us—Elizabeth Warren’s proposed wealth taxes will have devastating consequences on capital formation, and will encourage investors to hold riskier assets than they otherwise would have. In order to illustrate the magnitudes involved, some analysts translated Warren’s proposals into “equivalent” income tax rates.

However, wealth and income are different concepts, and in general taxes on wealth and income will have different effects. For those investors with a short planning horizon, a modest wealth tax has a relatively modest impact on the decision to save for the future. However, for those with longer time horizons, even a seemingly modest wealth tax has an economic impact akin to a large income tax.

Reprinted from Catalyst.

The Bogus “Consensus” Argument on Climate Change

The Bogus “Consensus” Argument on Climate Change

One of the popular rhetorical moves in the climate change debate is for advocates of aggressive government intervention to claim that “97% of scientists” agree with their position, and so therefore any critics must be unscientific “deniers.”

Now these claims have been dubious from the start; people like David Friedman have demonstrated that the “97% consensus” assertion became a talking point only through a biased procedure that mischaracterized how journal articles were rated, and thereby inflating the estimate.

But beyond that, a review in The New Republic of a book critical of mainstream economics uses the exact same degree of consensus in order to cast aspersions on the science of economics. In other words, when it comes to the nearly unanimous rejection of rent control or tariffs among professional economists, at least some progressive leftists conclude that there must be group-think involved. The one consistent thread in both cases—that of the climate scientists and that of the economists—is that The New Republic takes the side that will expand the scope of government power, a central tenet since its birth by Herbert Croly a century ago.

The Dubious “97% Consensus” Claim Regarding Climate Science

Back in 2014, David Friedman worked through the original paper that kicked off the “97% consensus” talking point. What the original authors, Cook et al., actually found in their 2013 paper was that 97.1% of the relevant articles agreed that humans contribute to global warming. But notice that that is not at all the same thing as saying that humans are the main contributors to observed global warming (since the Industrial Revolution).

This is a huge distinction. For example, I co-authored a Cato study with climate scientists Pat Michaels and Chip Knappenberger, in which we strongly opposed a U.S. carbon tax. Yet both Michaels and Knappenberger would be climate scientists who were part of the “97% consensus” according to Cook et al. That is, Michaels and Knappenberger both agree that, other things equal, human activity that emits carbon dioxide will make the world warmer than it otherwise would be. That observation by itself does not mean there is a crisis nor does it justify a large carbon tax.

Incidentally, when it comes down to what Cook et al. actually found, economist David R. Henderson noticed that it was even less impressive than what Friedman had reported. Here’s Henderson:

[Cook et al.] got their 97 percent by considering only those abstracts that expressed a position on anthropogenic global warming (AGW). I find it interesting that 2/3 of the abstracts did not take a position. So, taking into account David Friedman’s criticism above, and mine, Cook and Bedford, in summarizing their findings, should have said, “Of the approximately one-third of climate scientists writing on global warming who stated a position on the role of humans, 97% thought humans contribute somewhat to global warming.” That doesn’t quite have the same ring, does it? [David R. Henderson, bold added.]

So to sum up: The casual statements in the corporate media and in online arguments would lead the average person to believe that 97% of scientists who have published on climate change think that humans are the main drivers of global warming. And yet, at least if we review the original Cook et al. (2013) paper that kicked off the talking point, what they actually found was that of the sampled papers on climate change, only one-third of them expressed a view about its causes, and then of that subset, 97% agreed that humans were at least one cause of climate change. This would be truth-in-advertising, something foreign in the political discussion to which all AGW issues now seem to descend.

The New Republic’s Differing Attitudes Towards Consensus

The journal The New Republic was founded in 1914. Its website states: “For over 100 years, we have championed progressive ideas and challenged popular opinion….The New Republic promotes novel solutions for today’s most critical issues.”

With that context, it’s not surprising that The New Republic uses the alleged 97% consensus in climate science the way other progressive outlets typically do. Here’s an excerpt from a 2015 article (by Rebecca Leber) in which Republicans were excoriated for their anti-science stance on climate change:

Two years ago, a group of international researchers led by University of Queensland’s John Cook surveyed 12,000 abstracts of peer-reviewed papers on climate change since the 1990s. Out of the 4,000 papers that took a position one way or another on the causes of global warming, 97 percent of them were in agreement: Humans are the primary cause. By putting a number on the scientific consensus, the study provided everyone from President Barack Obama to comedian John Oliver with a tidy talking point. [Leber, bold added.]

Notice already that Leber is helping to perpetuate a falsehood, though she can be forgiven—part of David Friedman’s blog post was to show that Cook himself was responsible (Friedman calls it an outright lie) for the confusion regarding what he and his co-authors actually found. And notice that Leber confirms what I have claimed in this post, namely that it was the Cook et al. (2013) paper that originally provided the “talking point” (her term) about so-called consensus.

The point of Leber’s essay is to then denounce Ted Cruz and certain other Republicans for ignoring this consensus among climate scientists:

All this debate over one statistic might seem silly, but it’s important that Americans understand there is overwhelming agreement about human-caused global warming. Deniers have managed to undermine how the public views climate science, which in turn makes voters less likely to support climate action.

Now here’s what’s really interesting. A colleague sent me a recent review in The New Republic of a new book by Binyan Appelbaum that is critical of the economics profession. The reviewer, Robin Kaiser-Schatzlein, quoted with approval Appelbaum’s low view of consensus in economics:

Appelbaum shows the strangely high degree of consensus in the field of economics, including a 1979 survey of economists that “found 98 percent opposed rent controls, 97 percent opposed tariffs, 95 percent favored floating exchange rates, and 90 percent opposed minimum wage laws.” And in a moment of impish humor he notes that “Although nature tends toward entropy, they shared a confidence that economies tend toward equilibrium.” Economists shared a creepy lack of doubt about how the world worked. [Kaiser-Schatzlein, bold added.]

Isn’t that amazing? Rather than hunting down and demonizing Democratic politicians who dare to oppose the expert consensus on items like rent control—which Bernie Sanders has recently promoted—the reaction here is to guffaw at the hubris and “creepy lack of doubt about how the world [works].”

Conclusion

From the beginning, the “97% consensus” claim about climate change has been dubious, with supporters claiming that it represented much more than it really did. Furthermore, a recent book review in The New Republic shows that when it comes to economic science, 97% consensus means nothing, if it doesn’t support progressive politics.

Republished from the Mises Institute

Do We Really Have a Decade Left to Solve Climate Change?

Do We Really Have a Decade Left to Solve Climate Change?

Wise alecks on social media noted with amusement how Beto O’Rourke recently claimed humans had only ten years to act on climate change, thus one-upping Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez who had previously gone out on a limb by putting the deadline at twelve years. Snark aside, it’s important to point out that the “consensus science” as codified, for example, in the periodic reports from the United Nations do not support such a cliff-hanger mentality at all.

Our Political Figures Ignore the IPCC

The quickest way to make this point is to reproduce something I highlighted several years ago in an IER post where I caught Paul Krugman just making up stuff about climate change. Specifically, the following table comes from the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, the AR5 (Table SPM.2):

IPCC1.png
Source: IPCC AR5, Working Group III, Summary for Policymakers

To make it easier to read, I’ll excerpt the relevant left and right portions of the table below:

Screen-Shot-2019-05-09-at-9.47.20-AM.png
SOURCE: Adapted from IPCC AR5, Working Group III, Summary for Policymakers, Table SPM.2

There’s a lot of information in the table, but let me summarize the important elements vis-à-vis the recent claims from O’Rourke and Ocasio-Cortez. The beige cells in the adapted table above show the percentage increases in the total (undiscounted) mitigation costs necessary to achieve the far-left (white cells) atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases in the year 2100, for the years 2030-2050 and also for 2050-2100, for two different scenarios of total emissions (either below 55 gigatons of CO2-equivalent, or above).

In other words, the beige cells show us how much a delay of government action through the year 2030 will increase the cost necessary to achieve the specified atmospheric concentrations for the year 2100 (white cells). Specifically, the beige cells show that by “doing nothing” about climate change until the year 2030, even in a high-emission baseline scenario, the IPCC’s best guess of the cost of achieving the aggressive outcome rises by 44 percent in the years 2030-2050 and 37 percent in the years 2050-2100.

Now to be sure, the rhetorical point of the above table in the AR5 was to encourage support for climate mitigation policies. The people who put together this table for policymakers wanted to show, “Hey, since we’re obviously going to have to deal with climate change eventually, we might as well get going, because the longer we delay, the more expensive it will be.”

IPCC: An Inconvenient Truth

My modest point here, however, is to show that this table now poses an awkward stumbling block for those—like O’Rourke and Ocasio-Cortez—trying to scare people into supporting ludicrously expensive and aggressive proposals to “fight climate change.” If O’Rourke and Ocasio-Cortez were anywhere close to being correct when issuing their ever-shrinking windows for action, then in the IPCC table above, the beige cells should have all had infinity signs, and in a footnote it would explain: “If we wait until 2030 to begin mitigation efforts, we will all die.”

But that’s not what the UN report told us. Instead, it reported that yes, the costs of achieving various climate targets (as measured by atmospheric concentrations of CO2 in the year 2100) would be higher due to delay, but even in a pessimistic scenario, the best-guess of the cost increase was 44 percent.

Conclusion

In this post, I highlighted one particular table from the most recent UN report on the science of climate change in order to show just how baseless are the recent claims that humans have years to act on climate change. Over at Reason, Ronald Bailey marshals more evidence—again, from the very “consensus science” documents we are supposed to rely on—to show that these claims are nonsense.

This whole episode is yet another example demonstrating the farce of the climate change policy debate. Whenever a critic disagrees with the most radical proposals that would—according to their own proponents—transform Western society, the critic is berated as a science denier. And yet, even a cursory examination of the actual technical reports shows that the prophets of doom are the ones who are spouting forth unsupported claims.

Republished from mises.org.

The Upside-Down World of MMT

The Upside-Down World of MMT

[Editor’s note: MMT is back in the news, championed by Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and former Bernie Sanders advisor Stephanie Kelton. Economists like Brad DeLong and Paul Krugman are giving MMT at least faint praise, and even National Review has favorable things to say. Ironically, MMT is neither modern nor truly “monetary;” instead it is a combination of tired fiscal and monetary policies. Our Senior Fellow Robert Murphy first wrote this article debunking MMT in 2011, but every word applies today.]

Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) is a hip economic/financial paradigm apparently sweeping a world unsatisfied with mainstream economics. Over the past year, I have been hearing a growing number of people refer to MMT: either fans who think it blows up my Austrian views, or foes who think it deserves a full-scale critique.

MMT’s underground popularity derives from its seeming mathematical rigor, its disagreement with the obviously flawed doctrines of standard neo-Keynesian orthodoxy, and its underlying message of hope that the perceived constraints on government deficit spending are an illusion. The MMT proponents tell us that fiat monetary systems have removed the shackles associated with the gold standard, and that our economic recovery is limited only by our failure to understand how modern money and banking work.

After my admittedly brief exploration, I have concluded that the MMT worldview doesn’t live up to its promises. However, as an Austrian economist I know how annoying it is when “big guns” in the economics profession reject my own position as nonsense without even taking the time to spell out what is supposedly wrong with the Misesian approach. Therefore, in the present post I’ll try to fairly summarize a major plank in MMT thought and show why it is misleading at best, and downright false at worst.

Background on MMT

One thing I should make clear upfront is that MMT is not the same thing as neo-Keynesian economics, as expounded by the likes of Paul Krugman. In fact, Krugman has actively criticized the MMTers himself (to which they responded here and here, to list just two instances).

MMT is linked to the older doctrine of “chartalism,” for readers who are more familiar with the latter term. The fascinating aspect of MMT is that it turns standard views on their head. For example, MMTers hold that the sovereign issuer of fiat currency can never become insolvent. For the MMTers, the point of taxation isn’t to raise revenue for the government, but rather to regulate aggregate demand.

It would be foolish for me to try to summarize the MMT position, as I am sure I would offend its proponents by my imprecision. As Morpheus said of the Matrix, I cannot tell you of the worldview of the MMTers; you must see it for yourself. Warren Mosler’s website is reputed to be the best one-stop shop, and the comments at my open-ended blog post are filled with suggested readings from actual MMTers.

The Counterintuitive MMT Position on Government Deficits

To illustrate my problems with MMT, let’s focus on a specific issue: the debate over the government budget deficit. With Austrians and other libertarian types calling for immediate cuts in spending, while Keynesians call for future spending restraint and tax hikes to slow the increase in debt down the road, the MMTers come along and say both sides are ignorant.

According to many proponents of MMT, “deficits don’t matter” when a sovereign government can issue its own fiat currency, and all the hand wringing over the government’s solvency is absurd. In fact, the MMTers claim that given the reality of a US trade deficit, a sharp drop in the government’s budget deficit would hamper the private sector’s ability to save. Thus, the Austrians are unwittingly calling for a collapse in private saving when they foolishly demand government austerity.

I have scoured the websites of a few prominent MMTers and here is the best explanation of this reasoning that I could find. The quotation below is somewhat lengthy and contains equations, but reproducing it is the only way to be sure I am not misrepresenting the MMT position:

The national accounts concept underpins the basic income-expenditure model that is at the heart of introductory macroeconomics. We can view this model in two ways: (a) from the perspective of the sources of spending; and (b) from the perspective of the uses of the income produced. Bringing these two perspectives (of the same thing) together generates the sectoral balances.

So from the sources perspective we write:

GDP = C + I + G + (X — M)

which says that total national income (GDP) is the sum of total final consumption spending (C), total private investment (I), total government spending (G) and net exports (X — M) [i.e., exports minus imports].

From the uses perspective, national income (GDP) can be used for:

GDP = C + S + T

which says that GDP (income) ultimately comes back to households who consume (C), save (S) or pay taxes (T) with it once all the distributions are made.

So if we equate these two perspectives of GDP, we get:

C + S + T = C + I + G + (X — M)

This can be simplified by cancelling out the C from both sides and re-arranging (shifting things around but still satisfying the rules of algebra) into what we call the sectoral balances view of the national accounts.

(I — S) + (G — T) + (X — M) = 0

That is the three balances have to sum to zero. The sectoral balances derived are:

  • The private domestic balance (I — S) …

  • The Budget Deficit (G — T) …

  • The Current Account balance (X — M) …

A simplification is to add (I — S) + (X — M) and call it the non-government sector. Then you get the basic result that the government balance equals exactly $-for-$ … the non-government balance (the sum of the private domestic and external balances). This is also a basic rule derived from the national accounts and has to apply at all times.

For the purposes of our discussion, let’s simplify things by taking out the international-trade aspect. (We can justify this by looking at the world as a whole, which obviously can’t run a trade deficit or trade surplus,1 and then analyzing the effects of changes in the total budget deficits of all the various governments.)

So if we take out exports and imports, and rearrange the remaining terms, we derive this equation:

G − T = S − I

That is, the amount of government spending minus total tax revenue, is necessarily equal to private saving minus private investment. The MMTers might succinctly express this relationship in words:

Government Budget Deficit = Net Private Saving.

This equation underpins the MMTers’ disdain for the tea party’s call for fiscal austerity. We derived the above equation through accounting tautologies, not by relying on any particular economic theory, so it should be impregnable. And gosh it sure looks like if the government were to reduce its budget deficit, then the private sector’s saving would necessarily go down. Yikes! Have the Austrians been unwittingly advocating massive capital destruction without realizing it?

Of Course You Don’t Need the Government in Order to Save

When I first encountered such a claim — that the government budget deficit was necessary to allow for even the mathematical possibility of net private-sector saving — I knew something was fishy. For example, in my introductory textbook I devote Chapter 4 to “Robinson Crusoe” economics.

To explain the importance of saving and investment in a barter economy, I walk through a simple numerical example where Crusoe can gather ten coconuts per day with his bare hands. This is his “real income.” But to get ahead in life, Crusoe needs to save — to live below his means. Thus, for 25 days in a row, Crusoe gathers his ten coconuts per day as usual, but only eats eight of them. This allows him to accumulate a stockpile of 50 coconuts, which can serve as a ten-day buffer (on half-rations) should Crusoe become sick or injured.

Crusoe can do even better. He takes two days off from climbing trees and gathering coconuts (with his bare hands), in order to collect sticks and vines. Then he uses these natural resources to create a long pole that will greatly augment his labor in the future in terms of coconuts gathered per hour. This investment in the capital good was only possible because of Crusoe’s prior saving; he wouldn’t have been able to last two days without eating had he not been able to draw down on his stockpile of 50 coconuts.

This is an admittedly simple story, but it gets across the basic concepts of income, consumption, saving, investment, and economic growth. Now in this tale, I never had to posit a government running a budget deficit to make the story “work.” Crusoe is able to truly live below his means — to consume less than his income — and thereby channel resources into the production of more capital goods. This augments his future productivity, leading to a higher income (and hence consumption) in the future. There is no trick here, and Crusoe’s saving is indeed “net” in the sense that it is not counterbalanced by a consumption loan taken out by his neighbor Friday.

So how in the world are we to interpret the MMTers’ proclamation that “net private saving” necessarily equals the government’s budget deficit (if we ignore international trade)?

When I raised this question on my blog, Nick Rowe — who is a very sharp economist — defended the MMT statement in this way:

Robert [Murphy]: “In particular, I think it is crazy when people say that if the federal government runs a budget surplus, then by simple accounting the private sector can’t save.”

[Nick Rowe:] That’s perfectly correct, and standard, once you do the translation. Assume [an economy closed to international trade]. Define “private saving” as “private saving minus Investment” … which is how MMTers normally use the word “saving”, or sometimes “net saving”. Then it’s just standard National Income Accounting. Y=C+I+G, and S=Y-T-C, therefore S-I=G-T.

And there you have it: When MMTers speak of “net saving,” they don’t mean that people collectively save more than people collectively borrow. No, they mean people collectively save more than people collectively invest.

I’m not trying to make fun of Nick Rowe; he is a professional economist who has written some very nuanced posts relating MMT to more orthodox mainstream economics. But look at what he was forced to type: “Define ‘private saving’ as ‘private saving minus investment.'” As I noted in my response to Rowe, if we define “private saving” as “private saving,” then my critique of MMT stands. (That’s supposed to be funny, by the way — at least insofar as economics can be funny.)

Now Nick Rowe and the MMTers are certainly correct when they observe that “private saving net of private investment” can’t grow without a government budget deficit (again if we disregard foreign trade). But so what? The whole benefit of private saving is that it allows for more private investment.

This is the fundamental problem with relying on macro-accounting tautologies; people often bring in causal arguments from economic theories without realizing they are doing so. Let’s look again at the equation causing so much confusion:

G T = S I

As a free-market economist, I don’t need to run from this tautology. I can use it to underscore the familiar “crowding out” critique of government deficit spending. Specifically, if government spending (G) goes up while tax revenue (T) remains the same, then the left-hand side of the equation gets bigger as the government budget deficit grows. So the accounting tells us that the right-hand side must get bigger too. It may happen partially because people cut down on consumption and save more (due to higher interest rates and their expectation of higher tax burdens in the future), but it may also happen because private-sector investment goes down. In other words, as the government borrows and spends more, the equation tells us we might see lower private consumption, rising interest rates, and real resources being siphoned out of private investment into pork-barrel spending projects. I can tell my “story” of the dangers of government deficit spending with that equation just fine.

Of course, the Keynesians and MMTers would have a different spin on the result of higher government spending in our current economic environment, but that’s not really the issue here. My point is that the national-income accounting tautologies aren’t a good critique of the tea party after all. Those equations are just as consistent with economic theories claiming that government spending cuts will lead to faster economic growth. The fans of MMT should therefore stop pointing to those identities as if they prove the futility of government austerity during an economic downturn. Those tautologies, and the cherished equations of the three sectors, are consistent with post-Keynesian and tea party economics.

As a final way to illustrate the non sequitur of the equations involving government budget deficits, note that we could do the same thing with, say, Google. Go back through all the equations above, and redefine G to mean “total spending by Google.” Then C would be “total consumption spending by the-world-except-Google,” and so on.

After doing this, we would be able to prove — with mathematical certainty — that unless Google were willing to go deeper into debt next year, the world-except-Google would be unable to accumulate net financial assets, in the way MMTers define that term. The proper response to this (perfectly valid) observation is, Who cares?2

Not All Spending and Income Are Created Equal

Thus far I have accepted the MMT premises on their own terms, and shown that MMT’s proponents often read more into their neutral accounting relationships than is justified by the relationships per se. However, in this final section I want to point out something even subtler.

One way to describe MMT is that is a “nominal” model of the economy, looking at flows of money without inquiring too deeply about the economic significance behind the flows. This article is already lengthy, so let me illustrate the problem with an analogy.

Suppose Tabitha has an income of $100,000, out of which she consumes $90,000. Tabitha takes her savings of $10,000 and lends it at 5 percent interest to Sam, who signs over an IOU promising to pay Tabitha $10,500 in 12 months.

Now let’s stop and ask, did Tabitha save money in this scenario? Yes, of course she did. Another question: did Tabitha accumulate net financial assets? Yes, of course she did: she is holding a legally binding IOU from Sam, which possesses a current market value of $10,000 and will grow in value over time as the payoff date approaches. (Changes in Sam’s solvency and interest rates of course might inflict capital gains or losses along the way.)

Now let’s tweak the scenario. Suppose I tell you that Sam plans to raise the money needed to repay his loan by selling services to Tabitha. For example, suppose Sam used the $10,000 loan to buy equipment that he will then use to perform landscaping work on Tabitha’s property over the course of a year. Every month Tabitha pays Sam a fee for his services, and after the 12th month Sam takes these fees, which are equal to $10,500, and hands them back to Tabitha.

In this revised scenario, is it still true that Tabitha acquired a net financial asset when she bought the $10,000 IOU from Sam in the beginning? Yes, of course it is. Tabitha voluntarily purchases the landscaping services from Sam; the flow of money back and forth is a bookkeeping convenience. Economically, what happened is that Tabitha exchanged a stock of present goods up front for a stream of services over the course of the year.

Now let’s tweak the scenario one last time: Suppose that Tabitha lends $10,000 to Sam, who gives her an IOU promising $10,500 in 12 months. After the year passes, Sam walks up to Tabitha and sticks a gun in her belly, demanding $10,500 in cash. She hands it over to him, and then he gives it right back and tears up his IOU.

In this scenario, did Tabitha acquire a net financial asset when she originally lent the money to Sam? No, not really — especially if she knew how he planned on “repaying” her. In this case, Tabitha’s savings of $10,000 would have simply been confiscated by Sam. He can go through the farce of giving her an IOU and then robbing her in the future to “redeem” it, but economically that is equivalent to him simply robbing her of the $10,000 upfront. From Tabitha’s viewpoint, her $10,000 in savings vanished, while Sam’s consumption can rise by $10,000 without increasing his own indebtedness.

Now let’s expand the groups. Instead of the individual Tabitha, consider the group of all Taxpayers. And instead of the individual thief Sam, consider the institution Uncle Sam. The MMTers correctly tell us that the Taxpayers can’t accumulate “net financial assets” — i.e., drawing on income streams that originate outside the group — unless Uncle Sam runs deficits and issues them bonds.

But what is the point of accumulating bonds that will only be redeemed when Uncle Sam coercively raises the necessary funds from the same group of Taxpayers in the future? Any individual taxpayer can justifiably look at a Treasury bond as a net asset, because his or her own tax contributions will not vary significantly based on his or her investment decisions regarding Treasuries. But the private sector as a whole surely shouldn’t naively assume that if the government runs a $1.6 trillion deficit this year, this foretells of a shower of new income flowing “into the private sector” down the road.

I hope I’ve convinced the reader that something is very fishy with the MMT conclusions regarding private saving and government budget deficits. The error crept in at step one, with the equation GDP = C + I + G + (X M). The only justification for measuring “output” (left-hand side) by the summation of spending (on the right-hand side) is that in a market exchange, the “value” of something is whatever the buyer spends on it.

However, if the government can raise revenues through present taxation or by borrowing now and paying back with future taxes, then this justification falls away. It’s simply not true that $1,000 in private consumption or investment spending is an equivalent amount of “real output” to $1,000 spent by bureaucrats who raised the money without the consent of their “customers” and who may very operate under a “use it or lose it” appropriations process.

Conclusion

The MMT worldview is intriguing, if only because it is so different from even the way conventional Keynesians think about fiscal and monetary policy. Unfortunately, it seems to me to be dead wrong. The MMTers concentrate on accounting tautologies that do not mean what they think.


  • 1. In his third bullet point, the MMT writer Bill Mitchell incorrectly referred to (X M) as the “current account balance,” when strictly speaking it is the trade balance since we are talking about GDP rather than GNP. This is a very subtle distinction that is unimportant for this article, but the interested reader can read Greg Mankiw’s explanation.
  • 2. Note too that Google’s lack of a printing press isn’t relevant for the establishment of the accounting tautologies. The MMTers’ sectoral equations are true whether the government has a fiat currency or gold commodity money

Republished from mises.org.

The Idea That the Fed Is ‘Independent’ Is Absurd

The Idea That the Fed Is ‘Independent’ Is Absurd

President Donald Trump sparked controversy — as is his wont — when he recently told CNBC that he was “not thrilled” with the Federal Reserve’s announced hikes in short-term interest rates, which he claimed would hinder the economic expansion for which his administration had worked so hard. “I’m letting them [the Fed] do what they feel is best,” he added, but this assurance was not enough to prevent journalists and policy experts from pronouncing Trump’s remarks as unprecedented interference with the central bank’s independence.

It may be unusual for a president to openly voice such criticism, but it wouldn’t be the first time one has pressured the Federal Reserve for short-term political gain. In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson considered firing then-Fed Chairman William McChesney Martin, but upon learning this would probably be illegal, he opted instead to dress down the recalcitrant central bank chief at his Texas ranch. By Martin’s later account, a heated argument erupted that resulted in the president shoving him against a wall. According to financial journalist Sebastian Mallaby, as LBJ pushed Martin around the room, he yelled, “Boys are dying in Vietnam, and Bill Martin doesn’t care.”

Better known is President Richard Nixon’s tape-recorded collaboration with Fed Chairman Arthur Burns, Martin’s replacement, who maintained an easy-money policy to stimulate the economy before the 1972 election, which contributed to Tricky Dick’s landslide victory and fueled price inflation for the rest of the decade. In terms of the resulting capital destruction and economic dislocations, this episode is one of modern U.S. history’s greatest object lessons about the risks of executive power reaching beyond its constitutional authority.

For another example showing that Trump’s behavior is nothing new, consider that President George H. W. Bush had a running public dispute with then-Fed Chair Alan Greenspan over monetary accommodation. Bush would later blame “The Maestro” for his 1992 reelection loss.

Read the rest at the thefiscaltimes.com

3 Good Things About “Price Gouging”

3 Good Things About “Price Gouging”

As so often happens in the wake of a natural disaster, government officials in Texas are currently investigatingclaims of “price gouging,” which the office of the Attorney General reminds residents is illegal after the governor declares a disaster. This is a classic example of the ostensible contrast between greed and altruism, capitalism and charity.

Economists who favor the free market know the standard arguments for letting the price skyrocket to “clear the market” when there are supply shortages and demand spikes. These are important arguments, and indeed I will review them below.

At the same time, I think in our zeal to lecture the public on the efficient allocation of resources, we economists often forget to stress an important aspect of private morality when disaster strikes. Specifically, if certain individuals experience a genuine “windfall gain” simply because they happen to be holding goods that suddenly become very scarce, then these individuals can donate their windfall to support relief efforts.

In this way, there is no question of them profiting from their neighbors’ suffering. Market prices are still able to perform their valuable function of communicating information about supplies and demands to everyone in the system, while the losses imposed by nature are more evenly distributed because of charitable assistance given from the lucky to the unlucky.

The Standard Arguments for Letting Prices Clear the Market

After a natural disaster, the supplies of certain items — such as bottled water, gasoline, flashlights, and canned goods — become much more rigid, while the demand for these items goes through the roof. Consequently, the “market-clearing price,” at which the quantity supplied equals the quantity demanded, also may rise quite significantly. (There were reports of a convenience store in Houston charging $99 for a case of bottled water and $20 for a gallon of gasoline.)

It’s obvious why most people would find this outcome horrendous, and that government officials would reassure the public that such behavior won’t be tolerated.

Even so, free market economists stress the social benefits of allowing the price to rise in this scenario. We can break these benefits into those emanating from the supply side and those emanating from the demand side. (For an excellent discussion, listen to David R. Henderson’s recent appearance on the Tom Woods Show.)

Benefit 1: Calling in More Supplies

On the supply side, a much higher price acts as a loudspeaker telling the rest of the world: “Houston wants a lot more bottled water and gasoline!” Even though we might casually say that after a natural disaster, the supply of these items is fixed, strictly speaking that isn’t correct. Except in the most outrageous circumstances (such as an avalanche or radiation leak), outsiders can bring in additional amounts of these precious items.

It’s certainly true that morality comes into play here. For example, a convenience store owner who lives only an hour from Houston, and who has a big van, might decide to cancel his golf plans to instead make a few trips to either donate or sell “at cost” whatever supplies he has, in order to do his part in relieving suffering. Most Americans would probably say that was “the right thing to do” for somebody who found himself in that situation, when the news reported just how bad the flooding was.

But what about a convenience store owner who lives six hours from Houston? Is it acceptable for him to charge a bit more than “cost” or even “normal retail price” in order to recoup some of the sacrifice he would have to make — not just counting the gas in his vehicle but also the opportunity cost of missing work — if he were to make one or more round trips?

As we change the circumstances, Americans would begin to disagree about the exact moral obligations of various people who happened to have access to much-needed goods. But we can certainly agree that in practice more people would end up deciding to help move water, gasoline, flashlights, and other items into Houston, the more we allowed them to charge for these items once they unloaded them in the beleaguered city.

Also keep in mind that this “upward sloping supply curve” — meaning that as the price rises, there are more units of bottled water (say) in Houston — doesn’t just operate geographically, but it also operates temporally.

Benefit 2: Storing Up Goods for Emergency Use

For example, suppose the manager of a grocery store hears on the news that a hurricane is approaching. If she believes the authorities will let her charge whatever the market will bear, then she might decide to stock the warehouse with extra cases of water, flashlights, batteries, generators, etc. She knows that if the storm turns out to be a nothingburger, she will have to run a big sale the following week, in order to clear out the excess inventory. (After all, she presumably already had the optimal amount of inventory before the impending hurricane made her bulk up the warehouse.)

However, so long as our hypothetical grocery store manager knows she will be legally allowed to charge (say) quadruple the normal price in the event of flooding, then she will probably err on the side of loading up the warehouse with more units, compared to her decisions if she knows that the authorities will punish her for “gouging” her customers.

Similar reasoning holds for gas station owners, who might have the ability to load up on unusually large amounts of inventory — perhaps by having extra trucks come in, and remain on their property — but would only be willing to incur this extra expense, if they thought there were a possibility the market price of gasoline would break (say) $10 and that the authorities would allow them to charge such prices.

As these examples illustrate, the amount of bottled water, gasoline, batteries, etc. “on hand” in Houston when the hurricane struck is itself influenced by the attitude of the authorities toward “price gouging.”Business owners and pure speculators didn’t ship in as much of these goods as they would have done, in an environment in which voluntary transactions were sacrosanct legally.

In his interview with Tom Woods, Henderson also made a very subtle point about high prices inducing owners to carry goods forward in time. I’ll illustrate his point with a hypothetical story: In the current legal environment, with prohibitions against “gouging,” a Houston store owner sitting on a few pallets of bottled water would probably just unload them all on Day 1 and leave town, because there would be nothing else for him to do.

However, if the authorities and the public didn’t condemn owners for charging the true market price, such a person might reason, “Right now bottled water is selling for $10 per case in this neighborhood. But if the rain doesn’t stop and it takes longer than people expect for the streets to clear, it’s entirely possible that I could hold back 50 of my remaining cases in the back storeroom, and then sell them for $50 each in a few days. The prospect of getting an extra $2000 totally makes it worth my while to sleep here in the store for a few days, rather than leaving Houston.”

This type of analysis shows that we want high prices not simply to tell businesses in Arkansas that they should sell some of their bottled water in Houston, rather than unloading it all in Little Rock, but also to tell businesses in Houston that they should sell some of their bottled water on Day 5 after the hurricane rather than unloading it all on Day 1.

Benefit 3: Encouraging Conservation

In the previous section we outlined the social benefits of high prices coming from the increased quantity supplied of the crucial items. On the flip side, letting prices rise will also encourage conservation among the end users, so that any given supply of items is “rationed” among people more uniformly.

Consider bottled water. Once the storm hits and a particular family knows they will be stuck in Houston for several days with flooded streets, the first inclination might be to run to the store and stock up on needed items. At the normal retail price, a mother might buy 10 cases of bottled water, not only for drinking but also in case they need to use it for (say) boiling pasta. After all, who knows how long the utilities might be knocked out? She reasons that she can store the cases in her pantry and draw the water down over the next two months, if it turns out that things go back to normal sooner rather than later. There’s no harm in stocking way up on water, just in case.

But of course, this is exactly what we don’t want people to do, in a situation where there are only (say) 3 cases of bottled water per stranded family in the city. We want the people who hit the stores before their neighbors to be very judicious in how much they buy, because they need to leave other units on the shelves for the next families who show up.

This is exactly what an “unconscionable” price will do. If the store is charging $20 for a case of water that normally retails for $4, our hypothetical mother won’t so casually load 10 cases into her SUV. After that sticker shock, suddenly boiling pasta with bottled water won’t seem as appealing. Maybe she’ll only buy 3 cases of water, and get some cans of tuna fish and protein bars instead.

When it comes to gasoline, there is a particular perversity of anti-gouging rules in the case of an impending storm. Imagine yourself as a military commander, who has thousands of vehicles you need to move away from the coast, and you only have a limited amount of fuel on your coastal base. However, there are plenty of refueling depots a few hours inland. What do you do?

The obvious solution is to only allow your troops to put enough fuel in their vehicles to make it to next refueling station. This spreads the available fuel around so that you can evacuate as many vehicles as possible.

Now back to the real world: In the path of an incoming storm, where thousands of people want to evacuate the coast, depending on refinery interruptions and other bottlenecks, it’s possible that some local stations will run out of gas if they don’t raise their prices significantly. The people who are lucky enough to get to the stations first will naturally fill the tank up, before getting on the interstate to get out of Dodge. Then the unlucky followers will see the gas station is empty, and may end up stalling on the interstate. The authorities then have a problem of dealing with stranded motorists who are stuck not because of flooding, but because they ran out of fuel during their escape.

In contrast, if the few relevant station owners charge $15 per gallon, then people who had (say) a half-tank in their car when the storm hit, will say, “That’s outrageous!” and get back on the highway, to see if prices are any better in another 50 miles. At a price of $15, only people who are about to run out of gas will buy any, and even they will only purchase enough to give them some breathing room. They too will probably take their chances and hope that gas is cheaper if they move away from the storm. Just as our hypothetical military commander, the decentralized price system allocates the scarce fuel among the vehicles to allow as many as possible to evacuate.

Is It Moral to Profit While Others Suffer?

Some people on social media heard these familiar economist arguments, but pushed back. “Yeah, we get your points about ‘efficiency,’” they said. “But let’s face it: During a disaster, plenty of heroes rise to the challenge, putting themselves in harm’s way in order to do what they can to help people in need. It is simply wrong for some convenience store owner who had just coincidentally gotten in a shipment of bottled water the day before, to effectively hit the lotto while his neighbors lose their house.”

I am sympathetic to this point, and I agree that typical libertarian economists often come across as coldhearted and seem detached from this everyday morality. (Indeed, this was the position I took in my concluding essay to the Independent Institute’s new book, Pope Francis and the Caring Society.)

Yet rather than prohibit owners from charging “what the market will bear,” I think a better way to avoid personally profiting from the tragedy of others is to suggest that they donate their genuine “windfalls” to relief efforts.

For example, consider a convenience store owner who happens to be sitting on 100 cases of bottled water that he normally sells for $4. (Assume he didn’t take any special measures to bulk up before the storm hit; this is the inventory he would have been holding in any case.) Because of the flooding, he realizes he could probably charge $14 and still sell out. So there is a potential $1,000 ( = $10 margin of “gouging” x 100 cases) in pure windfall profit he could make.

The conventional moralists would say no, he should keep his price at $4. But they have in mind that he would otherwise take that $1,000 and pocket it.

Suppose instead, however, that the owner charges the full $14, but then donates his $1,000 windfall to a local relief effort that is handing out free packets of food and dry clothes to families who were flooded out of their homes and have literally nothing (including wallets). Or to make the point even more clearly, suppose he donates the $1,000 windfall to a local organization that uses the money to buy bottled water and hand it out to desperate people?

Once we go down this path, we see that the insistence on charging only $4 for the cases of water really just means that our hypothetical store owner is concentrating his $1,000 worth of charity on the particular Houstonians who happen to walk into his store and pull out their credit card to make a big purchase. What are the odds that these people are the ones in Houston most in need of his implicit $1,000 charitable donation that day?

Conclusion

As economists in the Austrian tradition stress more than others, market prices act as signals that allow humans to communicate valuable information with each other. Just as it would stymie relief efforts if rescue workers couldn’t use cell phones or walkie talkies in a disaster area, by the same token government officials hamper humanity’s ability to recover from a crisis when they prohibit market prices from letting producers and consumers talk to each other.

Reprinted with permission of the Mises Institute.

3 Good Things About “Price Gouging”

3 Good Things About "Price Gouging"

As so often happens in the wake of a natural disaster, government officials in Texas are currently investigatingclaims of “price gouging,” which the office of the Attorney General reminds residents is illegal after the governor declares a disaster. This is a classic example of the ostensible contrast between greed and altruism, capitalism and charity.
Economists who favor the free market know the standard arguments for letting the price skyrocket to “clear the market” when there are supply shortages and demand spikes. These are important arguments, and indeed I will review them below.
At the same time, I think in our zeal to lecture the public on the efficient allocation of resources, we economists often forget to stress an important aspect of private morality when disaster strikes. Specifically, if certain individuals experience a genuine “windfall gain” simply because they happen to be holding goods that suddenly become very scarce, then these individuals can donate their windfall to support relief efforts.
In this way, there is no question of them profiting from their neighbors’ suffering. Market prices are still able to perform their valuable function of communicating information about supplies and demands to everyone in the system, while the losses imposed by nature are more evenly distributed because of charitable assistance given from the lucky to the unlucky.
The Standard Arguments for Letting Prices Clear the Market
After a natural disaster, the supplies of certain items — such as bottled water, gasoline, flashlights, and canned goods — become much more rigid, while the demand for these items goes through the roof. Consequently, the “market-clearing price,” at which the quantity supplied equals the quantity demanded, also may rise quite significantly. (There were reports of a convenience store in Houston charging $99 for a case of bottled water and $20 for a gallon of gasoline.)
It’s obvious why most people would find this outcome horrendous, and that government officials would reassure the public that such behavior won’t be tolerated.
Even so, free market economists stress the social benefits of allowing the price to rise in this scenario. We can break these benefits into those emanating from the supply side and those emanating from the demand side. (For an excellent discussion, listen to David R. Henderson’s recent appearance on the Tom Woods Show.)
Benefit 1: Calling in More Supplies
On the supply side, a much higher price acts as a loudspeaker telling the rest of the world: “Houston wants a lot more bottled water and gasoline!” Even though we might casually say that after a natural disaster, the supply of these items is fixed, strictly speaking that isn’t correct. Except in the most outrageous circumstances (such as an avalanche or radiation leak), outsiders can bring in additional amounts of these precious items.
It’s certainly true that morality comes into play here. For example, a convenience store owner who lives only an hour from Houston, and who has a big van, might decide to cancel his golf plans to instead make a few trips to either donate or sell “at cost” whatever supplies he has, in order to do his part in relieving suffering. Most Americans would probably say that was “the right thing to do” for somebody who found himself in that situation, when the news reported just how bad the flooding was.
But what about a convenience store owner who lives six hours from Houston? Is it acceptable for him to charge a bit more than “cost” or even “normal retail price” in order to recoup some of the sacrifice he would have to make — not just counting the gas in his vehicle but also the opportunity cost of missing work — if he were to make one or more round trips?
As we change the circumstances, Americans would begin to disagree about the exact moral obligations of various people who happened to have access to much-needed goods. But we can certainly agree that in practice more people would end up deciding to help move water, gasoline, flashlights, and other items into Houston, the more we allowed them to charge for these items once they unloaded them in the beleaguered city.
Also keep in mind that this “upward sloping supply curve” — meaning that as the price rises, there are more units of bottled water (say) in Houston — doesn’t just operate geographically, but it also operates temporally.
Benefit 2: Storing Up Goods for Emergency Use
For example, suppose the manager of a grocery store hears on the news that a hurricane is approaching. If she believes the authorities will let her charge whatever the market will bear, then she might decide to stock the warehouse with extra cases of water, flashlights, batteries, generators, etc. She knows that if the storm turns out to be a nothingburger, she will have to run a big sale the following week, in order to clear out the excess inventory. (After all, she presumably already had the optimal amount of inventory before the impending hurricane made her bulk up the warehouse.)
However, so long as our hypothetical grocery store manager knows she will be legally allowed to charge (say) quadruple the normal price in the event of flooding, then she will probably err on the side of loading up the warehouse with more units, compared to her decisions if she knows that the authorities will punish her for “gouging” her customers.
Similar reasoning holds for gas station owners, who might have the ability to load up on unusually large amounts of inventory — perhaps by having extra trucks come in, and remain on their property — but would only be willing to incur this extra expense, if they thought there were a possibility the market price of gasoline would break (say) $10 and that the authorities would allow them to charge such prices.
As these examples illustrate, the amount of bottled water, gasoline, batteries, etc. “on hand” in Houston when the hurricane struck is itself influenced by the attitude of the authorities toward “price gouging.”Business owners and pure speculators didn’t ship in as much of these goods as they would have done, in an environment in which voluntary transactions were sacrosanct legally.
In his interview with Tom Woods, Henderson also made a very subtle point about high prices inducing owners to carry goods forward in time. I’ll illustrate his point with a hypothetical story: In the current legal environment, with prohibitions against “gouging,” a Houston store owner sitting on a few pallets of bottled water would probably just unload them all on Day 1 and leave town, because there would be nothing else for him to do.
However, if the authorities and the public didn’t condemn owners for charging the true market price, such a person might reason, “Right now bottled water is selling for $10 per case in this neighborhood. But if the rain doesn’t stop and it takes longer than people expect for the streets to clear, it’s entirely possible that I could hold back 50 of my remaining cases in the back storeroom, and then sell them for $50 each in a few days. The prospect of getting an extra $2000 totally makes it worth my while to sleep here in the store for a few days, rather than leaving Houston.”
This type of analysis shows that we want high prices not simply to tell businesses in Arkansas that they should sell some of their bottled water in Houston, rather than unloading it all in Little Rock, but also to tell businesses in Houston that they should sell some of their bottled water on Day 5 after the hurricane rather than unloading it all on Day 1.
Benefit 3: Encouraging Conservation
In the previous section we outlined the social benefits of high prices coming from the increased quantity supplied of the crucial items. On the flip side, letting prices rise will also encourage conservation among the end users, so that any given supply of items is “rationed” among people more uniformly.
Consider bottled water. Once the storm hits and a particular family knows they will be stuck in Houston for several days with flooded streets, the first inclination might be to run to the store and stock up on needed items. At the normal retail price, a mother might buy 10 cases of bottled water, not only for drinking but also in case they need to use it for (say) boiling pasta. After all, who knows how long the utilities might be knocked out? She reasons that she can store the cases in her pantry and draw the water down over the next two months, if it turns out that things go back to normal sooner rather than later. There’s no harm in stocking way up on water, just in case.
But of course, this is exactly what we don’t want people to do, in a situation where there are only (say) 3 cases of bottled water per stranded family in the city. We want the people who hit the stores before their neighbors to be very judicious in how much they buy, because they need to leave other units on the shelves for the next families who show up.
This is exactly what an “unconscionable” price will do. If the store is charging $20 for a case of water that normally retails for $4, our hypothetical mother won’t so casually load 10 cases into her SUV. After that sticker shock, suddenly boiling pasta with bottled water won’t seem as appealing. Maybe she’ll only buy 3 cases of water, and get some cans of tuna fish and protein bars instead.
When it comes to gasoline, there is a particular perversity of anti-gouging rules in the case of an impending storm. Imagine yourself as a military commander, who has thousands of vehicles you need to move away from the coast, and you only have a limited amount of fuel on your coastal base. However, there are plenty of refueling depots a few hours inland. What do you do?
The obvious solution is to only allow your troops to put enough fuel in their vehicles to make it to next refueling station. This spreads the available fuel around so that you can evacuate as many vehicles as possible.
Now back to the real world: In the path of an incoming storm, where thousands of people want to evacuate the coast, depending on refinery interruptions and other bottlenecks, it’s possible that some local stations will run out of gas if they don’t raise their prices significantly. The people who are lucky enough to get to the stations first will naturally fill the tank up, before getting on the interstate to get out of Dodge. Then the unlucky followers will see the gas station is empty, and may end up stalling on the interstate. The authorities then have a problem of dealing with stranded motorists who are stuck not because of flooding, but because they ran out of fuel during their escape.
In contrast, if the few relevant station owners charge $15 per gallon, then people who had (say) a half-tank in their car when the storm hit, will say, “That’s outrageous!” and get back on the highway, to see if prices are any better in another 50 miles. At a price of $15, only people who are about to run out of gas will buy any, and even they will only purchase enough to give them some breathing room. They too will probably take their chances and hope that gas is cheaper if they move away from the storm. Just as our hypothetical military commander, the decentralized price system allocates the scarce fuel among the vehicles to allow as many as possible to evacuate.
Is It Moral to Profit While Others Suffer?
Some people on social media heard these familiar economist arguments, but pushed back. “Yeah, we get your points about ‘efficiency,’” they said. “But let’s face it: During a disaster, plenty of heroes rise to the challenge, putting themselves in harm’s way in order to do what they can to help people in need. It is simply wrong for some convenience store owner who had just coincidentally gotten in a shipment of bottled water the day before, to effectively hit the lotto while his neighbors lose their house.”
I am sympathetic to this point, and I agree that typical libertarian economists often come across as coldhearted and seem detached from this everyday morality. (Indeed, this was the position I took in my concluding essay to the Independent Institute’s new book, Pope Francis and the Caring Society.)
Yet rather than prohibit owners from charging “what the market will bear,” I think a better way to avoid personally profiting from the tragedy of others is to suggest that they donate their genuine “windfalls” to relief efforts.
For example, consider a convenience store owner who happens to be sitting on 100 cases of bottled water that he normally sells for $4. (Assume he didn’t take any special measures to bulk up before the storm hit; this is the inventory he would have been holding in any case.) Because of the flooding, he realizes he could probably charge $14 and still sell out. So there is a potential $1,000 ( = $10 margin of “gouging” x 100 cases) in pure windfall profit he could make.
The conventional moralists would say no, he should keep his price at $4. But they have in mind that he would otherwise take that $1,000 and pocket it.
Suppose instead, however, that the owner charges the full $14, but then donates his $1,000 windfall to a local relief effort that is handing out free packets of food and dry clothes to families who were flooded out of their homes and have literally nothing (including wallets). Or to make the point even more clearly, suppose he donates the $1,000 windfall to a local organization that uses the money to buy bottled water and hand it out to desperate people?
Once we go down this path, we see that the insistence on charging only $4 for the cases of water really just means that our hypothetical store owner is concentrating his $1,000 worth of charity on the particular Houstonians who happen to walk into his store and pull out their credit card to make a big purchase. What are the odds that these people are the ones in Houston most in need of his implicit $1,000 charitable donation that day?
Conclusion
As economists in the Austrian tradition stress more than others, market prices act as signals that allow humans to communicate valuable information with each other. Just as it would stymie relief efforts if rescue workers couldn’t use cell phones or walkie talkies in a disaster area, by the same token government officials hamper humanity’s ability to recover from a crisis when they prohibit market prices from letting producers and consumers talk to each other.
Reprinted with permission of the Mises Institute.

Reflections on Donald Trump’s Election

Reflections on Donald Trump’s Election

As the markets and pundits react to Donald Trump’s enormous upset victory, let me offer my own reactions. As an economist, I will focus on matters pertaining to economic policy.

The Danger of Hubris and Denial. Everybody recognizes that the “experts” and polls were totally wrong. Indeed, I was listening to NPR around 6 p.m. Eastern time on Election Night, and these commentators were all but speculating on President Clinton’s Cabinet. Later, around midnight, I was curious how NPR’s anchors would handle the blow. I am only slightly exaggerating when I say that the explanation was, “Trump motivated more bigots than we expected.”

Yet this type of reaction reflects a complete evasion of the media elite’s own failings. Indeed, part of the support for Trump came from people who are not bigots but are sick and tired of being called names simply for disagreeing about the proper size of government. I didn’t vote for Trump—I no longer vote, as a matter of principle—but I have had discussions with plenty of Trump supporters in the past two years. I don’t know a single person who approved of his boorish comments about women; they were all voting for him despite his obvious flaws as a person.

Look folks, there was no mystery about what Trump was running against. He laid it out clearly in his final ad. The critics dismissing this ad as a “dog whistle” for anti-Semites—as if someone couldn’t have legitimate reasons to criticize Janet Yellen or George Soros—are refusing to acknowledge reality. I’m reminded of the Keynesians who dealt with the surge in unemployment after implementation of the Obama stimulus package—where unemployment with the package was worse than what they warned would happen if the government “did nothing”—by arguing, “Wow, the economy was worse than we realized.” Likewise, after being utterly wrong about this election, many Establishment pundits reacted by saying, “Wow, the United States is worse than we realized.”

Read the rest at The Beacon here.

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