The origins of the First World War are often explained through the familiar language of alliances, national interests, and the European balance of power. Yet, as I have previously argued, such explanations mistakenly treat governments as unitary actors, pursuing coherent national objectives through rational deliberation. A more useful approach is that of libertarian realism, which begins by asking who actually formulated foreign policy, what institutional interests they possessed, and how much influence they exercised over the politicians formally responsible for making decisions.
Britain’s entry into the First World War offers a particularly revealing case. While the Liberal government of Herbert Asquith remained divided over intervention between radicals and imperialists in August 1914, a relatively small circle of Foreign Office officials, known to history as the “Grey Group,” had spent years cultivating an increasingly antagonistic view of Germany and strengthening Britain’s diplomatic alignment with France and Russia—all out of view from the public, Parliament, and even the rest of the Cabinet.
When Sir Edward Grey became foreign secretary in 1905, he brought with him a group of like-minded anti-German hawks. Among the most important of these were Sir Charles Hardinge, Permanent Under Secretary from 1906 to 1910; Sir Arthur Nicolson, permanent under-secretary from 1910; Sir Eyre Crowe, an influential assistant under-secretary; Sir William Tyrrell, Grey’s private secretary; and Sir Francis Bertie, Britain’s ambassador in Paris
Though out of step with the public, as well as the rest of their own government, both of which were more Russophobic than anti-German, they nonetheless succeeded in shaping the terms of the debate and eventually the diplomatic environment.
Consider Crowe’s famous memorandum of January 1, 1907, concerning British relations with France and Germany. Crowe presented German naval expansion, colonial and diplomatic ambitions as fundamental challenges to Britain’s security. Conciliation and accommodation, he argued, which had done so much to improve relations with France and Russia, would do nothing but invite further trouble where the Germans were concerned.
Hardinge was even more emphatic in his opposition to détente with Berlin, calling Germany: “The only aggressive power in Europe.” On its face a dubious claim, particularly given Russian Balkan policy, to take just one example, he went further in claiming that Berlin desired “Supremacy in Europe,” a claim completely unsupported by any evidence.
Not that facticity proved any hindrance to a belligerent policy percolating in the London Foreign Office. Picking up where his predecessor had left off, Nicolson averred, “The ultimate aims of Germany surely are, without doubt, to obtain the preponderance on the continent of Europe, and when she is strong enough, [to] enter on a contest with us for maritime supremacy.”
Speaking at the height of the Agadir crisis, Tyrell likewise opined, “What she [Berlin] wants is the hegemony of Europe.”
So, we can see that in the years leading up to 1914 the British foreign office was staffed at its highest levels by a cabal of anti-German policymakers, with Grey at their head. This matters because foreign-policy decisions are only formally made by political leaders, with the information necessary to make those decisions the purview of permanent officials. Diplomats select which developments deserve attention, interpret foreign intentions, prepare memoranda, maintain relationships with foreign counterparts, and present ministers with their own assessments of available options—often the options themselves. The resulting information asymmetry creates a familiar principal-agent problem. The politician formally directing policy depends upon subordinates whose preferences may not coincide with his own, to say nothing of any such obfuscating abstraction like “national tnterest.”
To be clear, this does not, per se, require a conspiracy, corruption, or even conscious disloyalty. Officials can sincerely believe that their preferred diplomatic arrangements serve the country while simultaneously benefiting professionally from the preservation and expansion of the institutions through which they exercise influence. The danger is that such institutional preferences acquire the appearance of objective national necessities when framed as such during their promulgation in official policies.
Once Germany was understood within influential circles as an inherently antagonistic power, policies intended to accommodate German interests could increasingly appear naive, dangerous, or irresponsible to those looking to keep office.
Meanwhile, the logic of the policy becomes embedded in the bureaucracy and develops an inertia all its own. The Foreign Office spent years developing relationships with French and Russian counterparts, while military conversations had further institutionalized cooperation with France.
These arrangements did not constitute an automatic treaty obligation requiring Britain to enter the continental war. Nevertheless, they created expectations, relationships, and reputational considerations that complicated neutrality.
So even though Berlin had given up the naval arms race by 1912 and Moscow was looking increasingly like a problem for British imperial interests on the Indian frontier in Persia, to say nothing of encouraging trouble in the Balkans, the anti-German policy continued.
The consequences of this during the July Crisis were to be profound.
As stated at the outset, Grey’s diplomatic commitments and the close association of his office with the Entente placed him in a different position from many of his colleagues in the Liberal Cabinet, such as Burns, Morley, and Simon, who opposed intervention in a continental war and resigned when London plunged in.
Grey’s own conduct is instructive, as he did not initially persuade his colleagues through a comprehensive presentation of Britain’s strategic interests. Rather, he threatened resignation, turning the question of intervention into a political crisis within the government itself—since without Grey the support of Liberal Imperialists like Winston Churchill would be withdrawn and the government would have collapsed.
None of this to suggest a monocausal explanation for Britain’s entry into the First World War. It is, however, to complicate the notion that intervention emerged from a dispassionate assessment of an uncontested national interest. It did not, and in making a list of how important Foreign Office anti-German bias was, it would rank highly indeed.
Economist Murray Rothbard and commentator Justin Raimondo understood that foreign policy must be examined by identifying the individuals and organizations actually exercising power, rather than attributing every decision to an abstract national interest. Bureaucratic officials, like politicians, respond to incentives, possess preferences, and operate within institutional structures that shape their behavior—one need look no further than Washington’s policies toward Russia after the collapse of the USSR, which formulated by people like former Secretaries of State Madeleine Albright and Antony Blinken could scarcely help but be anti-Russian.
The lesson is thus an eternal one. When the costs of war are borne by millions while the decisions leading to it are concentrated in the hands of a relatively small political and bureaucratic establishment, skepticism toward official invocations of national interest is not merely warranted. It is indispensable.


































